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THE MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

EDITOR: H. D. A. MAJOR, D.D., F.S.A.
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A State without the means of change is without the means of conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

No. 11. FEBRUARY, 1936. Vol. XXV.

SIGNS OF THE TIMES

The Religion of King George V.

A distinguished English admiral who knew the late King well, was speaking of the King's religion : 'The King is a good Churchman,' said the admiral. 'He means,' said his wife, in a lower tone, 'that the King is a good Christian man.'

This is an accurate account of our late King's religion. It was simple, sincere, Scriptural. The King performed three religious duties : he prayed daily : he read the Scriptures daily : he attended public worship on Sundays. This lay religion, as free from pietism as from fanaticism, constituted the foundation of his high sense of duty and devoted public service. This religion the King owed in part to his tutor, the late Canon Dalton of Windsor, a member, we may add, of the Modern Churchmen's Union.

Dr. Bouquet, in a letter to the *Times* of January 31st, points to the significance, the apologetic significance, of the late King's religion. He writes :

> It would appear then that Communists, Buddhists, Moslems, agnostics have all united at the present juncture to honour a life which has resulted from nothing more nor less than from believing and practising Christianity as a simple layman. Does not this confirm in a startling manner the claim which Christians make that he who genuinely holds their faith is 'more at home in the Universe' than anyone else? And does it not tell us a profoundly impressive truth about the nature of that Universe, and about the quality of that Self-Existent Being Who is the ground and basis of its existence?

The maintenance of a pure and exacting morality without a religious basis seems to be impracticable for a nation, although it may be possible for individuals. The problem to-day is how to secure this religious basis. This can only be done in a world of growing knowledge and progressive thought by freeing religion from beliefs and traditions which are no longer credible, and by stressing the supreme value of the essential and eternal elements in the Christian religion with the purpose of increasing the depth and breadth of its influence. This is the purpose of Modernism. Modernism is not a new religion but a revaluation of the Christian religion and its practical application to new spheres of human activity.

THE CHURCH AND STATE REPORT.*

The late Hastings Rashdall, commenting on Gierke's *Theory of Corporations*, said: 'There is need for an essay on the psychology of corporations. For corporations, like individuals, possess a psychology of their own.'

The late Alfred Fawkes used to say: 'We do well to remember that the Church is a woman.' If Fawkes was right, then the State is a man, and the relation between Church and State in this country has its parellel in matrimony. When either of the contracting parties begins to give more thought to its rights than to its duties the matrimonial union is in jeopardy.

As the result of the Church's growing self-consciousness, excessively stimulated by the Anglo-Catholic movement during the last hundred years, it was only to be expected that a situation of acute tension should ensue between the State and a Church increasingly dominated by Anglo-Catholic ideals: especially when the ideals of what are the Church's primary duties and rights are viewed by the high contracting parties from entirely different angles.

The Archbishops' Commission on Church and State, whose Report has just been issued (Jan. 24, 1936), is one of the numerous products of this tension. The Commission was appointed by the Church Assembly in 1930 as the outcome of the double rejection of the Deposited Book by the House of Commons. This rejection created for the clericalist mind 'an intolerable situa-

* *Church and State*, published by the Press and Publications Board of the Church Assembly, Church House, Westminster, Vol. I, 2/6; Vol. II, 7/6.

tion,' although the rejection was regarded with deep satisfaction by the great body of Church people. As the years have passed since the rejection, even clericalist feeling has moderated, and the number of clericalist Diehards, who wished to disestablish the Church as the result of that rejection, is almost restricted to the person of the Bishop of Durham, the heroic and eloquent protagonist of lost causes. As a consequence the Report just issued does not advocate Disestablishment; it suggests various modifications in the relations of Church and State. These deserve serious and immediate attention. It is significant that the main reason for advocating these changes is not that they will relieve the Church from the intolerable tyranny of the State, but that they will tend to bring about unity within the Church itself, and relieve the consciences of the clergy who have promised to use, in their public ministrations, the services in the said Book prescribed (1662) and none other except in so far as is sanctioned by lawful authority.

We doubt the validity of the reasons alleged. The securing of unity within the Church can only come about as the outcome of an enlargement of the minds and hearts of Church people—particularly the Clergy—and this is an educational, ethical, and spiritual process. It cannot come about by the raising, once again, of the dangerous and difficult constitutional issue between Church and State which threatens to divide, rather than to unite, Church people. As for the easing by this means 'an intolerable situation' created by the inability of the Clergy to obey literally their promise that they will use 'the form in the said Book prescribed, and none other, *except so far as shall be ordered by lawful authority*,' this creates little, if any, moral distress to the vast majority of active, practical, parish priests today. The Anglo-Catholic priest interprets the lawful authority, which is additional to and superior to the Prayer Book regulations, as the Canon Law. That Canon Law, he is convinced, he, as a priest of the Catholic Church, is bound to obey, and not only he, but the English Bishops also, and he knows where it can be found and where it is practised: and that is in the Church of Rome, which thus becomes his liturgical model.

On the other hand the great majority of the Evangelical and Liberal Clergy have no hesitation in omitting, or adding to, or

altering, the prescribed Prayer Book services, provided such omissions, additions and alterations make Public Worship a more real and helpful thing for their congregations. And providing also that this be done in loyalty to the spirit and teaching of the Prayer Book itself. We observe nothing conscience-stricken in the attitude of Canon Sheppard, a leader in this type of liturgical expansion and experiment, and he is typical of many others. Some years ago, the position was 'intolerable' for a number of conscientious clergymen, who have since died or resigned. Had the situation been remedied then, so as to relieve the clergy from a literal obedience to the Prayer Book rubrics, much pain and strain would have been saved to clergymen of tender conscience. But that situation is long since passed. As the Church authorities did not remedy the situation, the great bulk of the clergy have remedied it, according to their lights. Thus have they secured, what they believe to be, a reasonable freedom from liturgical legalism. If any consciences are troubled to-day it is those of the Bishops. And if the Episcopal conscience is troubled it is because liturgical discipline has broken down. There are many Churchmen who feel that if liturgical experiment be intelligently inspired and reasonably directed for some years to come, it may be turned to great advantage for our religious life, and that there is no reason to alter the relations between Church and State for the purpose of dealing with the developing liturgical situation.

A Round-table Conference.

The Commissioners preface their proposed constitutional changes by advocating the summoning of a round-table conference which shall try to secure agreement among the representa tives of all Church parties with regard to permissible deviations from the Order of Holy Communion contained in the Prayer Book of 1662; and also agreement with regard to the use of, and limits of, Reservation. Perhaps we may hope that, at the present time, agreement may be secured with regard to these acutely controversial issues. Should it, however, be secured, we fail to see the necessity for making constitutional changes, when it would be so very much more simple and straightforward to secure from Parliament assent to this agreement. This, we

all know, would be readily forthcoming from Parliament. Had the Deposited Book been an agreed measure, it would have passed Parliament without doubt. Why do the Church authorities not take this course? It is because an influential section are resolved never again to submit to Parliament for its assent any Church measure dealing either with faith or worship. Yet is not this the renunciation of an agreement reached with the State as a result of which agreement the Enabling Act was secured? The terms of this Act were accepted by the Church authorities as an end of all controversy. Is there not then something dishonourable in the Church trying to secure at a later date further concessions from the State? Many Churchmen will feel uncomfortable. The ground, however, for the new demands is that the State has grievously misused its powers possessed under the Enabling Act. This, however, was definitely denied by the late Archbishop of Canterbury. When Parliament rejected the Prayer Book it only did what it had a perfect right to do under the terms of the Enabling Act. Other Churchmen, while admitting this, maintain that the new demands are justified because they will, if granted, give the Church more freedom to carry on her work. This is denied by many other Churchmen who are in agreement with the following statements:

'I think that no changes in the present relations of Church and State are desirable.'[1]

'I think the Church has complete freedom for her task.'[2]

Whether then they be honourable or dishonourable, needful or needless, the following changes in the Constitution and relationship of Church and State are proposed by the Commissioners.

Abolition of the Parliamentary Veto.

Any measure dealing with the Church's doctrine or worship, provided this be certified by the Lord Chancellor, the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the two Archbishops, as 'spiritual,' shall not (as at present required) be submitted to Parliament: but having been sanctioned by the votes of the Church Assembly, the Convocations, and at least three-fourths of the Diocesan conferences, shall be presented for the Royal Assent after such measure has been certified by the two Arch-

[1] The Bishop of Birmingham, p. 314, Vol. II, of the Report.
[2] Sir Thomas Inskip, Attorney-General, p. 102, Vol. II.

bishops as being 'neither contrary to nor indicative of any departure from the fundamental doctrines and principles of the Church of England' as set forth in the Thirty-Nine Articles and the Book of Common Prayer.

There seem to us to be two very serious objections to this proposal. (1) The first arises from the unrepresentative character of the House of Laymen in the Church Assembly. Until this be radically reformed and a body of laity secured much more representative of lay Church feeling than at present, there would be great danger of the further alienation of the laity from the National Church by the passing of ecclesiastical measures which would have neither their support nor their sympathy. Various proposals have been made for securing such a reformed House of Laity, but until it be secured, it seems to us, no additional power ought to be conceded to the Church Assembly than that which it at present possesses. The most urgent reform of a constitutional kind is reform in this matter of lay representation. Therefore we would urge that before other matters be proceeded with our Church authorities should take this in hand. Were such a lay representation secured as that which the Church of Scotland possesses a further weakening of Parliamentary control over English Church legislation might be sympathetically considered. But until such a reform be secured the power of Parliament in this sphere cannot, without grave detriment and danger, be reduced.

(2) The second objection concerns the greatly increased power given to the Archbishops by permitting them the right of granting a final certificate that the proposed changes are loyal to the essentials of Prayer Book doctrine and worship. This means that during the whole preliminary proceedings in which the measure is assuming shape the Archbishops will exercise a practical veto. Should an Archbishop say in the Church Assembly: If that be put in, or if this be taken out, or if that be formulated otherwise, I shall not be able to give my certificate, the Church Assembly would be absolutely at his mercy.

If a certificate is to be given in such a hypothetical case, it ought not to be given by any person or persons belonging to the Church Assembly but by an outside body whose impartiality and judgment could be trusted by the nation. It seems to us that no

better body could be found for this purpose than the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in ecclesiastical causes, on which the Archbishops may sit as assessors. If the Commissioners' plan were modified in the two ways indicated, we think that it is possible that quite a number of Churchmen, who would otherwise be in opposition, might be got to support the measure.

Constitution of a New Court of Appeal.

The second constitutional change proposed by the Commissioners is the substitution of a new and specially constituted Final Court of Appeal to take the place of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in ecclesiastical causes.

For the purpose of constituting this court there shall be a panel nominated by the two Archbishops with the approval of the Convocations and consisting of two classes: (1) Persons of high judicial experience, (2) Bishops and other persons whether clerical or lay, otherwise specially qualified. It is suggested that the Lord Chancellor might select the court consisting of two persons from each class, and one from the first class to preside. This would be the final Court of Appeal in all causes dealing with matters of faith and worship.

This proposal has little to commend it. The reputation of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is so great and its judgments in causes ecclesiastical have been of such outstanding quality and value for the Church that only a *doctrinaire* ecclesiasticism, concerned, not with practical issues but with ecclesiastical prejudices, could suggest the substitution for it of such a court as that proposed. It ought to be remembered that when the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was constituted the final court of appeal in ecclesiastical causes, it was not forced upon an unwilling and recalcitrant Church but received the whole-hearted assent and support of the Church authorities of that day. Moreover, each of the great Church parties, Low, Broad, and High, has appealed to it in turn and has received the justice of protection. The minor proposal, that Bishops should sit in Court with their Chancellors, and Archbishops sit in the Provincial Courts when trying matters of doctrine, ritual and ceremony, will meet, we imagine, with no objection.

Pastoral Tribunals.

The establishment of Pastoral Courts will commend itself to few. These Courts are to try ritual offences but have no power to sentence those found guilty. In such cases the Bishops will proceed by way of admonition and censure. As the Bishops possess this power at present and are able to exercise it most effectively in private, we can see no real use for these Courts. The less publicity there is in such cases the better.

If, however, we are to have Pastoral Courts in which the Bishop tries ritual offences, then, it seems to us, that admonition and censure should constitute only the first stage, and that where such are neglected by the offender, the Bishop should proceed to suspension for a period, say, of six months. And if this also prove ineffective, then the Bishop should proceed to deprive the offender of all ecclesiastical offices and emoluments.

The proposals for arranging for the trial of Bishops and Archbishops will doubtless excite our evening newspapers, and may even stimulate the imagination of our writers of detective stories, but we can hardly hope to have the re-enactment of such scenes in modern times as the trials of Cranmer, Ridley, Latimer, Hooper and Ferrar recall, or such a dramatic incident as occurred in the life of a fifteenth century Bishop of Chichester, when the Archbishop of Canterbury, addressing him in Court, said: 'Reginald, thou must either recant or burn.'

The proposal to increase the power of the Bishop (although we may add that nearly every proposal of the Commissioners will directly or indirectly have this effect), so as to enable him to refuse Institution of a presentee to a benefice who has not previously satisfied the Bishop of his willingness to obey the law as to the conduct of Divine Service and as to the ornaments and fittings of churches, has been long overdue as a practical necessity for the securing of liturgical order.

Appointment of Bishops by the Crown.

We are glad to observe, since there is such general satisfaction with the quality of those nominated by the Crown to the Episcopate, that no proposal is made by the Commissioners to deprive the Crown, acting through the Prime Minister, of this right. The Commissioners are, however, of the opinion that the

Cathedral Chapter that is empowered to elect the Crown's nominee should be free to act without being subject to the penalties of *Praemunire*. This we whole-heartedly support. Whilst the Chapter would thus be free without penalty to reject the Crown's nominee, it should be required to give its reasons in writing for its action. It is not clear, we think, from the Commissioner's Report, that they are convinced of the necessity for this precaution. Should the Chapter's reasons, given in writing, prove prejudiced or frivolous, it would always be possible to appoint the rejected nominee to the See by Royal Letters Patent. In view of the high sense of responsibility displayed in the nomination of Bishops and in view of the responsible character of the Cathedral Chapters, it is extremely improbable, unless party spirit ran excessively high, that any royal nominee would ever be rejected. It is also proposed by the Commissioners that the Archbishops and Bishops should be free to refuse consecration if they think fit. This seems to us to be a right which ought to be conceded.

Some Further Proposals.

There are a number of other proposals, not the least important of which concerns marriage. The Commissioners report:

> 'We think that the Church should be free to determine the conditions upon which persons may be married with the Church's rite, or after a marriage which from the Church's standpoint is irregular, may be admitted to Holy Communion' (p. 102).

This agrees with the recommendation made to the Commissioners by the representatives of the Modern Churchmen's Union.

The proposal to secure a revision of the Canon Law looks to us like a sop thrown to the Anglo-Catholic Cerberus. So long as the sop satisfies, rather than increases his voracity, few will feel any objection. We think, however, that there should be attached to this new edition of the Canon Law a translation with notes of the *Defensor Pacis* of Marsiglio of Padua.

The question which presents itself to the practical mind is whether proposals of the Commissioners modified in the form we have suggested (which represents, we believe, the maximum of concession which Evangelicals and Modernists can make to Anglo-Catholicism in this sphere) will satisfy the more extreme

elements in the Anglo-Catholic party. We doubt very much whether they will, and if our view be correct, then there is little use in wasting the time of our Bishops and Clergy in trying to secure their legalization. It is only agreed proposals which have any chance of being legalized by Parliament.

Spiritual Power or Ecclesiastical Independence.

The Prime Minister, in a noble speech on the death of our beloved sovereign George V, pointed with much truth to 'the growing spiritual power of the Crown' throughout the British Empire. This growth of spiritual power is of the right kind. It is not a growth of legislative or statutory authority in ecclesiastical affairs, but a growth dependent upon the character and conduct of the Sovereign, and the reverence and love which he evokes in the breasts of his subjects.

The Prime Minister might also have referred to the growing spiritual power of Parliament — based upon the character and conduct of that body — its serious concern for humanitarian reform at home, and peace and righteousness abroad. As the nation considers both Crown and Parliament, it is conscious of this growing spiritual power. Both are profoundly Christian — judged by Christ's standard — the standard of character and conduct, spirit and policy.

The serious question is whether the nation can feel that there is any growing spiritual power on the part of the Church of England. We dare not anticipate the answer. Yet the only way for the Church to secure growth of spiritual power is not by securing constitutional changes, but by an improvement in the quality of its ministry, its character and conduct, reflecting, in all its activities and endeavours, the spirit and mind of Christ. Viewed from this standpoint, the recommendations of the Archbishops' Commission seem to be concerned with matters of little moment; they may minister to ecclesiastical scrupulosity and even to ecclesiastical pride; they will certainly, if carried, add greatly to the power of the Episcopate, and reduce that of the laity in the management of Church affairs, but whether they will assist the growth of the spiritual power of the Church in the only way that really matters may well be questioned. We have an increasingly Christian Crown; we have an increasingly Chris-

tian Parliament; but we need an increasingly Christian Church.

We regret that the Commissioners, in dealing with Establishment, have not brought forward any proposal for the re-establishment of the Church of England in such a manner as to comprehend within that Establishment our Free Church Communions. It is necessary for the moral and spiritual welfare of the nation that the Established Church should not only be as Christian but also as comprehensive as possible. In this connection we are compelled to add that we deeply regret that the Commissioners have stressed the negative clause in our present declaration of Churchmanship[1] instead of proposing its excision.

[1] I . . . declare that I . . . am a member of the Church of England, and do not belong to any religious body which is not in communion with the Church of England . . .

ACADEMIC THEOLOGY AND THE DEMAND FOR CHANGE[1]

By Prof. F. J. Foakes-Jackson, D.D., D.Litt.

THE *Cambridge Review* is defined as a 'Journal of University Life and Thought.' It was founded in 1879. It is older than its Oxford contemporary, and has outlived innumerable Cambridge attempts to supersede it. For it has always reflected the trend of thought in the University, and I at least read it regularly to discover in what the young men of intelligence are interested. In the course of 56 years the main interest of the hour has varied in the strongest fashion but never more than at present, when the Regius Professor of Divinity has in a sermon demanded that the character of the present Theological Tripos should be modified. This has evoked a correspondence in the columns of the paper, which may result in far more than the manner in which Cambridge is to bestow its honours in a single subject which attracts comparatively only a few students.

I must trouble the uninitiated with a few words as to what this Theological examination is. In 1851, when to the old Triposes, the Mathematical and the Classical, were added those

[1] A paper addressed to a body of clergymen in New York.

on the Moral and Natural Sciences, the Theological Tripos came into existence. It consisted in 1879 (my year) of Old and New Testament and Church History (compulsory), and optional papers on History, Liturgics, Dogmatics, etc. To-day the Tripos is divided into two parts, but I omit details.

It has never been able to secure a large entry; but, having examined for it frequently, I know the required standard is high; and I note that in one period of seven years only 22 first-classes were awarded, twelve of whom attained episcopal and professorial honours, and one the headship of a college in Cambridge. All candidates in these years 1878—1883 must have had a competent knowledge of Hebrew, and Hellenistic Greek and Patristic Latin; and this has continued down to the present time, only, I believe, Hebrew is no longer compulsory. The result has been continuously an output of work which would do credit to any University; its object has been to produce not so much efficient pastors or eloquent preachers as men really competent to deal with the principles of theology on a severely scientific basis, in other words, able to test religious beliefs by accurate knowledge of the languages in which they were originally expressed, and the conditions under which they were developed.

On 17th October Dr. Raven, Regius Professor of Divinity, to whom no one would deny the right to rank among those trained under the best traditions of Cambridge scholarship, both classical and theological, preached a sermon before the University, in which he pleaded for a larger conception by the University of its function as a teacher of Theology. He spoke as follows:

> In our statutes education and religion are closely united: in profession they share a common objective 'that men may have life and may have it more abundantly'; in experience, as recent study of psychology proves, there can be no real education apart from a clear ideal wide enough to integrate the character and strong enough to give it motive and direction. What of religion — and of theology — among us? Does theology, the intellectual interpretation of religion, fulfil here its explicit duty of supplying to mankind the answer to his questionings, the full knowledge of the mystery which, whatever his dogmas, he must needs desire to apprehend?
>
> This is neither the place nor the occasion for a detailed reply. But at least this should be said. Our present scheme of study in 'Divinity' is centred, and rightly centred, upon the Christ — upon the records of the Old Testament which prepared for Him, of the New Testament which preserve His impact upon His immediate followers, of the Early

> Church which developed the experience of Him into an organized institutional and doctrinal system. But when the scheme was drawn up it inevitably concentrated attention upon the text, language and historicity of the documents — matters then of primary importance. To some extent the work undertaken by it has been done; in any case such limitations no longer represent the centre of theological interest. Much of our studies are of little more than antiquarian value; much are so meticulous as to exceed the powers and distort the outlook of all save exceptional students. In any case they do not now cover a sufficiently wide field whether we have in mind the promotion of theological knowledge or the needs of men training for the ministry of the Churches. The syllabus has almost no relation to our outlook upon the nature and evolution of the Universe, upon the history of religious development outside the Bible, upon the character and psychology of religious experience, or upon those problems of individual and social ethics which press so heavily upon us all. It is impossible to regard a curriculum so limited as any longer adequate. What was of primary value as a basis for study in Westcott's day is no longer appropriate either to the development of the subject or to the circumstances of the time or to the needs of the students.

This not unreasonable demand has brought on the controversy which is now being raised in the correspondence columns of the *Cambridge Review*.

On November 15th an article, written by Stanley Arthur Cook, appeared which deserves most serious attention. It is inspired by Dr. Raven's sermon and the series of essays, *Christianity and the Social Revolution*, both of which deplore the inadequacy of the Christianity of to-day to take its share in that 'Social Revolution' which alone can save the world. Dr. Cook is admittedly one of the leading Biblical scholars of the day; and as he was one of the sub-editors of the *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, he is a representative of advanced criticism. But his life work has convinced him that when the writers of these essays 'use the contents of the Bible to propose a *modus vivendi* between Christianity and Communism, they betray a lack of sound learning and scholarship.' 'For,' he adds, 'Biblical study is a serious discipline, as serious as Social Philosophy, Ethics, Bio-Chemistry, etc., etc., in which the writers are specialists.' To quote Dr. Cook again, 'Those who would accept a Communistic Christianity or a Christian Communism are, as such, prepared for a novel but sterile Christianity — lacking continuity with the main course of the development of Religion.' The whole article is academic and displays the fine courtesy of one professor criticizing another.

In the same issue a younger member of the Divinity Faculty raises the issue more directly in answer to a letter in the previous issue. One passage of his may be quoted :

> 'The Theological Tripos supplies a fine intellectual discipline in the sphere to which it belongs. Those who do well in it have learned something of languages of history of criticism, they have learned to think critically and to approach controversial questions in a spirit of scientific detachment.'

The writer goes on to deny that the Tripos discipline in Cambridge is narrow, and his own record shows that he received a good training in modern philosophy and ethics. He concludes with a somewhat unjust attack on American methods, and quotes a private letter from a friend whose vigour of expression in both countries was always considered more remarkable than his discretion. The answer to all this came in the next number. Dr. Raven, leading off with an article answering the Professor of Hebrew, shows himself in sympathy with his colleague in his desire to correlate the study of Theology with modern thought, but differs in his emphasis on the practical rather than the scientific aspect of the approach to Divinity. At the conclusion the Regius Professor gives his own experience as a Canon of Liverpool in instructing the younger clergy and remarks that very few cared to keep up the little theological learning they possessed and set themselves to learn the modern mind. One can neither blame those young men nor dispute what Dr. Raven says; but his concluding statement needs serious consideration :

> 'If Christian students go down from the University with a First Class in the Theological Tripos but completely untrained in the modern problems that cluster round the subjects of sex, property and war — that is in biology, psychology, economics, sociology and philosophy, the consequences cannot but be disastrous.'

The whole question is of more than clerical or academic importance. It affects a great principle as to whether the highest education should be diffusive and popular, or restricted in order to secure thoroughness.

The demand of the younger generation can be compressed into a nutshell. It is virtually that the past should be ignored, and stress laid exclusively on the present. The same tendency is manifested on all sides; in art, in music, in poetry and in philosophy, everything is admired, not because it is true, but

because it is new. A distinguished Scottish philosopher was told, 'We do not pay much attention to Plato, because he is out of date. What we value is what we learn from the man of to-day.' On the other hand an aged and retiring Oxford don once said to me, 'I read Plato, because he approaches the eternal problems of philosophy with a freshness we cannot hope to possess after all the dicussions of the intervening centuries.' It is, however, difficult to persuade the coming generation that the old may be at least as important as the new.

In the second letter, alluded to above, which is signed A.G., there is a suggestion as to what the younger men require:

> 'Instead of lectures on particular set books, let there be lectures on
> (*a*) The Comparative Study of Religion.
> (*b*) Modern Church History.
> (*c*) Christian Ethics and Modern Economic Problems.
> (*d*) The Psychology of Religious Experience.'

By all means: especially as each one requires as severe a discipline to understand as any subject in a Theological Tripos. But hard as these are to master, they require very little knowledge to talk about, and a single lecture or even a brief course, which is all that can be expected, leaves the student with only a smattering of, probably, ill-digested facts. For instance, I have known three professors of Comparative Religion in America, each one of whom is or was as much a specialist as any great astronomer, who could give a lecture of thrilling interest to me, though I am perfectly unable to understand the processes by which he arrived at his conclusions.

These subjects are naturally preferred to lectures on set books; for the exposition of a single book or document, if thorough, must be far less enthralling than a popular lecture on a general subject which can only skim the surface of a subject, whereas in explaining a single passage, verse, or even word, hours may be required. But a minute study of a subject is a necessary discipline in the pursuit of any science, and all knowledge is science. Theology has been called the Queen of the Sciences and, if so, she demands the same drudgery of her followers. It is as impossible to make a theologian by popular lectures on other sciences like economics or psychology as it is to make an astronomer by interesting talks about the celestial

luminaries. Just as the astronomer has to go through an arduous study of mathematics, the theologian must submit to the discipline of acquiring languages and much else.

But it is objected that Theology, scientifically studied, is dull. So is everything worth learning. It is recorded of Turner, the most imaginative of painters, that a lady asked him how he acquired the 'knack' of depicting breakers on the beach. 'Damned hard work, Ma'am,' was his reply. Genius is required to attain excellence, which only becomes possible after drudgery. The scholastics are the parents of modern Universities, and these were above all things scientists, for their chief object was not so much to edify as to reconcile the revealed truths of the Christian religion with reason, by submitting them to the cold test of logic, as taught by Aristotle and his successors. The schoolmen were as dry and academic as it is possibe to be, but no one with even a smattering of philosophy can deny that they made valuable contributions to human thought, and that they laboured in the cause of science. But as the Middle Ages drew to a close the modern young men poured much the same scorn on the futility of their science of the schools as those of to-day on the textual criticism of the Scriptures, and the careful exposition of words in the Bible. Both agreed in holding up the Old Learning to scorn as useless to satisfy the demands of their day. But the discontent at the scholastic philosophy was manifested at a time called the 'Revival of Learning'; not that the abused Middle Ages were really ages of Ignorance — far from it — but the transition from the old to the new was one from one kind of learning to another. To-day the desire is to change the dull study of theology, which seems at first necessarily unfruitful, for something to be acquired with little trouble which may have immediate practical results.

I will now try to say what the discipline of the Tripos did for me. I learned some Hebrew, including composition and unprepared translation from the Bible, and acquired a capacity to read the LXX, and I prepared critically a good deal of the New Testament. There was a long period of ancient Church History and two special periods to be studied, and also the Creeds and Confessions of the Reformation and the Liturgies. It was in truth a formidable examination, all of which was comparatively

new to me when I began to study for it, and represented more than three years' work. But the discipline taught me how to acquire not only what attracted, but also much that I disliked and was not particularly interested in; moreover, I had learnt how to study by myself and to know what were my chief interests. My experience as a teacher has since forced me to cover a fairly wide field.

Let me now try to imagine what I might have been if I had had the privilege of an up-to-date theological education as suggested by Dr. Raven. As I was only an indifferent classical scholar, I should not have gone on with my Greek, but Hebrew might have attracted me for awhile. Being possessed of a good memory and a power of getting out of books whatever interests me and omitting the rest, with a taste for desultory reading, I might have picked up a quantity of information, have acquired a sort of glibness on a variety of topics. It was the irregularity of the Hebrew verb and the eccentricity of the Greek particle which saved me.

The subjects on which Dr. Raven lays so much stress ought to be, and can now be at Cambridge, studied as specialities. Otherwise what are necessary for a minister are far better learned by the practical experience of life. True, they ought to be spoken of and have lectures devoted to them in theological seminaries; but the function of a University is not to prepare for a clergyman's career but for a serious study of theology; and it is even the business of a seminary to see that no man is sent forth with a mere vocational training, and not before it is assured that he knows his Bible well and something of the origin and history of the Christian faith. If it is objected that a scholarly training unfits a man for practical life, one may well mention two Cambridge men who became bishops with little or no previous practical training, one of whom made the See of Durham a model of ecclesiastical administration, and the other, who succeeded him, brought about a satisfactory settlement of a coal strike which threatened the peace of northern England, Bishops Lightfoot and Westcott. May I add that the best practical advice I ever heard given to candidates for the ministry came from an American scholar who was fully qualified to share their throne, George Foote Moore of Harvard University.

CHRISTIANITY AND SCIENCE

By the Right Rev. E. W. Barnes, Sc.D., D.D., LL.D., F.R.S.,
Bishop of Birmingham.

HE who, accepting alike the methods and the conclusions of scientific enquiry, to-day also proclaims his acceptance of the Christian faith is exposed to attack from two sides. There are, on the one hand, those of his fellow-churchmen whose beliefs are bound up with the dualism that runs through Catholic theology. They oppose natural and supernatural: they see God 'interfering' with the normal working of His realm, and are insistent on the miraculous element in the Christian tradition. On the other hand, there are those who also consider belief in the supernatural as the most distinctive characteristic of religion, and for this very reason repudiate religion. They assert that religion claims that a spiritual world exists which is not subject to the operation of natural law; and because this claim cannot be sustained, they contend that modern civilization has no alternative but to make choice between religion and science.

Let me, at the outset to-day, make my own position clear. On the one hand, I maintain that the dualism which opposes natural and supernatural is false. It does not belong to true religion, neither can it be incorporated into a reasonable theology. The spiritual is an emergent from the biological, just as the living has been an emergent from the non-living. All such emergencies are part of the creative activity of God. God does not break into His scheme to reveal Himself or to make further progress: He works through the past. This is the modernist as opposed to the traditionalist conception of Divine action.

But, on the other hand, the outside critic who confuses the spiritual with the supernatural equally misunderstands spiritual reality. By reason of such misunderstanding such a critic can immediately conclude that he who believes in the spiritual denies that uniform activity of God which is the basal postulate of science: he can go on to assert that for this reason the spiritual is a fantasy which science must repudiate. He can therefore talk of developing science at the cost of religion. But these false

oppositions are, of course, based on the fundamental mistake of confusing the spiritual with the supernatural.

I wish to-day to insist that the spiritual exists in its own right as a part of the Divine scheme. So also the physical, the biological and the mental exist. Surely the reflective man cannot refuse to allow that there is a realm of values just as there is an inorganic realm. And religion exists to relate that realm of values to the purpose which God had in fashioning the Universe and creating ourselves.

The uniqueness of Christianity consists of the way in which, following the teaching of Jesus, it defines this purpose which God had, and has, in creation. It asserts, first of all, that the world in which man finds himself is not an illusion, nor is his striving vain. We cannot 'wish away' the world of our experience. Facts are facts. Evil is evil, and we can no more escape the consequences of evil acts than we can fail to get spiritual joy from goodness. Thus, according to the Christian scheme, man can attain to an ever fuller apprehension of truth: and further, because truth is one of the fundamental values of the Universe, man must seek it. In this belief Christianity and science are at one. I may add that, in my opinion, it is no accident that science has flourished peculiarly within an environment created by post-Renaissance Christian belief. The man who seeks the truth for its own sake, and he who seeks it that thereby he may draw nearer to God — these men are comrades.

In the second place, Christianity asserts that God is not merely power. He is also righteousness and love. Man, therefore, must base order in the city, the state, and ultimately throughout the world, not on force but on justice and right. It is true that the harsh operation of so-called natural law often seems to negative the idea that God is love. But, granted the necessity of evil, it is difficult to imagine how the world could be other than it is. And without a doubt evil has been useful: it has been a spur to progress in the evolutionary scheme: and we can well understand that if, as Christ taught, men are on earth disciplined and trained for a higher life hereafter, what we suffer has its value. Humanity has sought to overcome that which is evil and, in trying to improve its environment and its lot, has created such civilization as that to which we have

attained. Our civilization to-day would be much further advanced — medical science, in particular, would have overcome many of our diseases — were it not that, because of our evil instincts, we waste our opportunities. The nations of the world go to war because they are so stupidly jealous, suspicious and fearful one of another. Christianity, so far from being hostile to science, would — were its principles more widely accepted — create a world in which science, and especially medical research, could progress rapidly, men of every race co-operating in friendly and honourable competition.

Now let me put to you a question. Whence comes man's conviction that truth and goodness are at the heart of things, that beauty is the garment with which God adorns the earth? Whence has come man's mind? Whence has come the guiding power which from primitive organisms fashioned the mammals and finally man? As I see the matter, it is ridiculous to imagine that in the fundamental particles of physics — electrons, protons, neutrons and the rest — there resides the potentiality of man. I am forced to the belief that the source of all existing life is a unity of creative power — that unity which we term God. Moreover, just as God, through those mutations whose origin is at present difficult to understand, has created the evolutionary progress of which man is on earth the crown, so, as it seems to me, God has created the mind of man.

I personally cannot think of God as fashioning man as a workman makes an elaborate machine. God is closer to His creation than any such analogy would suggest. There must be some ground of union common to God and man, if we are to explain why we possess a capacity for apprehending that truth and goodness belong to the Divine nature. In fact, just as I conceive that with purpose and plan God has fashioned man's body by relatively small changes separating countless generations of ancestors, so concurrently He has shaped man's mind, not to be an instrument alien from Himself, but to be, to use the old words, in His image. We should not be able to formulate the uniformities of nature by schemes rational to our minds were it not that there was some element common to the mind of man and to the Divine Mind. And I conceive that as God has fashioned, and is fashioning, the body of man, so He has

fashioned, and is fashioning, his mind. Just as we influence one another by psychical processes which we cannot at present understand, so, I conceive, God's influence surrounds us. The ground of union between man and God makes possible alike man's approach to God in prayer and God's response. Of course, such response is not supernatural, for — as I insisted at the beginning of this address — there is no supernatural realm where God abandons the uniform operation of laws which express His will. But, just because the spiritual emerges from and belongs to the same natural order as the physical and the biological, so I believe that one and the same Creative Power influences, and has influenced, man's physical and spiritual growth. To use familiar words, in God we live and move and have our being.

The unique nearness to God which Christianity assigns to Jesus of Nazareth becomes intelligible when we understand that there is a ground of union between man and God. The appearance of Jesus the Christ was not a so-called supernatural intrusion into a world where God had to correct some grievous mistake, as though the Eternal were a mere bungler. Christ's coming was, though singularly impressive, like to, and within the scheme of, God's continuous revelation of Himself. God spake, and speaks, by His prophets. In Jesus we believe that He fully revealed Himself so far as was possible under human limitations. You may say that the belief is an absurdity. But the test is whether, by His teaching and by His example, Jesus showed that He truly and fully understood God's nature. Men at different levels of spiritual perception will judge differently. Personally I find, in the view of life which I draw from Christ, so satisfying an understanding of God's purpose and of man's duty and destiny that I am not troubled by doubts as to the Incarnation. I can best express my reverence for Christ when I say that He was *the* Son of God.

THE PAPAL SOCIAL TEACHING

ON May 15th, 1931, the present Pope, Pius XI, issued an encyclical-letter (*Quadragesimo Anno*) 'on the reconstruction of the social order.' It was in commemoration and reaffirmation of an encyclical (*Rerum Novarum*) published forty years before, and on the same subject, by his predecessor, Leo XIII.

The present state of European social and political life, and the increasing activity of the Roman Church in connection with it, give special interest to the question: What actually is the social and political teaching of the Papacy? The aim of the present article is to answer that question as impartially as possible, restricting critical comments to matters on which they are unavoidable.

During his long Pontificate—from 1878 to 1903—Pope Leo XIII laid down, and elaborated in great detail, the main principles of that teaching; and the encyclicals in which he did so have been adopted and supplemented by his successors: Pius X, Benedict XV, and the present Pope, Pius XI.

In studying the subject it is needful to bear in mind the degree of authority claimed for Papal encyclicals. They are circular letters to Roman Catholic bishops, dealing with current questions, and differ from briefs, and from bulls, in that the two last classes are of more particular and local application. How far, if at all, do encyclicals come within the scope of Papal infallibility as defined by the Vatican Council of 1870? That definition said that when the Pope speaks *ex cathedrâ*—*i.e.* when, as shepherd and teacher of all Christians, he defines a doctrine, concerning faith or morals, to be believed by the universal Church—he is possessed of 'that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed His Church to be furnished.' Such definitions *may be* made in encyclicals. Each case is to be decided on its merits.

> 'Encyclicals are not necessarily *ex cathedrâ* pronouncements, though the Pope could, if he so willed, issue definitions in that way. The faithful are bound to give them a religious assent, interior as well as exterior, and obedience and respect' (Addis and Arnold, *Catholic Dictionary*, ed. 1917, p. 298).

The significance of this should be noted. It is always left possible, in the future, to disown any encyclical; while, in the present, Roman Catholics are bound to accept (*even mentally*) every one of them. The Church 'has it both ways'!

The Papal conception of civil power is that its origin is *theistic and moral*: it comes from God (but we must remember always that the Roman Church, claiming to be sole teacher of Divine truth, asserts her own right to interpret what is implied in that origin).

> 'The law of nature is the same thing as *the eternal law*, implanted in rational creatures and inclining them *to the right action and end;* and can be nothing else but the eternal reason of God, the Creator and Ruler of all the world' (Leo XIII, encyclical *Libertas*—'on human liberty'—1888).
>
> 'Therefore the nature of human liberty, however it is considered, whether in individuals or in society, whether in those who command or in those who obey, supposes the necessity of obedience to some supreme and eternal law, which is no other than the authority of God, commanding good and forbidding evil' (*Libertas*). 'The very notion of civilisation is a fiction of the brain if it rest not on the abiding principles of truth and the unchanging laws of virtue and justice' (Leo XIII, *Inscrutabile*—'on the evils affecting modern society'—1878).

When the Popes have condemned 'liberalism,' what they have censured are the naturalistic and secular theories of power which would reject or disregard the theistic basis; as Leo XIII said (*Libertas*):

> 'To reject the supreme authority of God, and to cast off all obedience to Him in public matters or even in private and domestic affairs, is the greatest perversion of liberty and the worst kind of liberalism; and what we have said must be understood to apply to this alone, in its fullest sense.' (As to this, see remarks further on.)

How does this teaching affect, in the mind of the Papacy, the democratic theory that political power comes from the people? The reply would be that it may come from them *mediately*, but not *ultimately*. 'The origin of public power is to be sought for in God Himself, and not in the multitude' (Leo XIII, *Immortale Dei*—'on the Christian constitution of States'—1885). However:

> 'It is not of itself wrong to prefer a democratic form of government, if only the Catholic doctrine be maintained as to the origin and exercise of power. Of the various forms of government the Church does not reject any that are fitted to procure the welfare of the subject' (*Libertas*). 'The right to rule is not necessarily bound up with any special mode of government. It may take this or that form, provided only that it be of a nature to insure the general welfare' (*Immortale Dei*).

State authority, however, must not so extend its power as to become tyrannical (though, it must be remembered, much that seems to other people to be tyranny is regarded by the Roman Church as defence of the faith. The Elizabethan Cardinal Allen in his *Defence of English Catholics* illustrates this).

> 'If those in authority rule unjustly, if they govern overbearingly or arrogantly, and if their measures prove hurtful to the people, they must remember that the Almighty will one day bring them to account' (*Immortale*). 'The contention, then, that the civil government should at its option intrude into and exercise intimate control over the family and the household is a great and pernicious error . . . Not only is such interference unjust, but it is quite certain to harass and worry all classes of citizens, and subject them to odious and intolerable bondage' (*Rerum Novarum*). 'Here we find we are confronted by . . . an ideology which resolves itself into a true, real pagan worship of the State — the 'Statolatry' which is no less in contrast with the natural rights of the family than it is in contradiction with the supernatural rights of the Church' (the present Pope, Pius XI, encyclical *Non Abbiamo*—'on Catholic Action'—1931). 'Of its very nature the true aim of all social activity should be to help individual members of the social body, but never to destroy or absorb them' (Pius XI, *Quadragesimo*).

Indeed, if State action greatly exceeds its just province — and certainly if it encroaches on matters of ecclesiastical right — not only is resistance justifiable, but it may be a duty.

> 'If it should please legislators and rulers to enjoin or sanction anything repugnant to the divine and natural law, then the dignity and duty of the name of Christian, and the Apostolic word, proclaim: "Obey God rather than man" (*Acts* v, 29)' (Leo XIII, *Quod Apostolici* — 'on modern errors' — 1878). 'Whenever there exists, or may be feared, an unjust oppression of the people on the one hand, or a deprivation of the Church's liberty on the other, it is lawful to seek such change of government as will produce liberty of action' (*Libertas*). 'If the State's laws manifestly vary from the Divine Law, containing enactments hurtful to the Church, or conveying injunctions adverse to religious duties, or if they violate, in the person of the Pope, the authority of Christ, then truly resistance is a duty, and it is a crime to obey' (Leo XIII, *Sapientiae Christianae* — 'on the duties of Christion citizens' — 1890).

Now, all this calls for comment. Leo denounced — and his three successors have continued to denounce — political rulers who are tyrannical: yet in the past Popes have supported despotic monarchs, and at present the Papacy has a Concordat with Italian Fascism, though that régime is based on denial of political liberty. It seems, then, that in the mouth of the Papacy the word 'tyranny' is vague. It is chiefly for use when any State acts to the disadvantage of the Papacy.

As to 'Church and State,' the Papacy teaches that the former (by which it means only the *Roman Catholic* Church) has right of 'pre-eminence' because of 'its eternal mission,' but that Church and State each has freedom: provided that (what the Roman Church regards as) proper limits are observed.

> 'The Founder of the Church willed her sacred power to be distinct from the civil power . . . provided that union and concord should be maintained between them, and that on those questions which are, though in different ways, of common right and authority, the power to which secular matters have been entrusted should happily and becomingly depend on the other power which has in its charge the interests of heaven' (Leo XIII, *Arcanum Divinae* — 'on Christian marriage' — 1880). 'The Church, no less than the State itself, is a society perfect in its own nature and its own right, and those who exercise sovereignty ought not so to act as to compel the Church to become subservient or subject to them, or to hamper her liberty in the management of her own affairs, or to despoil her in any way of the other privileges conferred on her by Jesus Christ. In matters, however, of mixed jurisdiction, it is in the highest degree consonant to nature, as also to the designs of God, that, so far from one of the powers separating itself from the other — or, still less, coming into conflict with it — complete harmony, such as is suited to the end for which each power exists, should be preserved between them' (*Immortale*).

In the 'syllabus of the principal errors of our time' (*Complecteus praecipuos*), published by Pope Pius IX in 1864 as a supplement to his encyclical *Quantâ Curâ*, the 19th error censured was that

> 'the Church is not a true and perfect and entirely free association; and [that she] does not enjoy peculiar and perpetual rights conferred upon her by her Divine Founder, but [that] it appertains to the civil power to define what are the rights and limits within which the Church may exercise authority'; and the 42nd error censured was that 'in the case of conflicting laws between the two powers, the civil law ought to prevail.'

All this seems vague; but the inner meaning of it is clear. The Church (meaning the *Roman Catholic* Church) has full liberty to decide disputes between herself and the State, for by divine right she is paramount. She may have to give in, in some cases, for a time; but in so doing she merely bows to superior physical force for the time being, and her *de jure* claims remain untouched; should the pressure of necessity be removed which extorted from her a compromise, she will repudiate what she did under that pressure, and will assert her full claims. *She* is paramount.

This brings us to the Papal teaching as to what ought to be

the attitude of a rightly-constituted State toward toleration and liberty of conscience, speech, publication, and so on. Here again we shall find vagueness on the surface but, under that surface, clear reservation of full power to the Roman Church.

> 'The State, constituted as it is, is bound to observe the manifold duties linking it to God, by public profession of religion. Nature and reason, which enjoin holy worship by individuals (because we belong to God), bind also the State' (Leo XIII, *Immortale*). 'Justice and reason forbid the State to be godless, or—what ends in godlessness—to treat the various religions (as they call them) alike, and to bestow upon them promiscuously equal rights and privileges. Since, then, the profession of one religion is necessary to the State, that one must be professed which alone is true, and which can be recognised without difficulty, especially in Catholic States, because the marks of truth are, as it were, engraven upon it' (Leo XIII, *Libertas*).

This seems at first sight very confused reasoning. Who is to decide which religion 'alone is true'? Is the State to decide? Then the decision will differ according to who has power in this or that country; in Italy, Roman Catholicism will be 'alone true.' In Norway, it will be Lutheranism; in Japan, Shintoism; in Arabia, Islam; and so on. Or are the religious bodies themselves to decide? If so, each will decide differently. The apparent logical confusion, however, is only on the surface. What the Pope really means is that, whenever it has power, the Roman Church will claim special privileges. As to freedom itself:

> 'The modern growth of liberty must be considered in detail. And first let us examine that liberty in individuals which is so opposed to the virtue of religion, namely, the "liberty of worship," as it is called. This is based on the principle that every man is free to profess, as he may choose, any religion or none. But assuredly, of all duties which man has to fulfil, that, without doubt, is the chief and holiest which commands him to worship God with devotion and piety . . . Wherefore, when a liberty such as we have described is offered to man, the power is given to him to pervert or abandon with impunity the most sacred of duties, and to exchange the unchangeable good for evil, which, as we have said, is no liberty, but is its debasement, and the abject submission of the soul to sin' (*Libertas*). 'The liberty of thinking, and of publishing, whatever each one likes, without any hindrance, is not in itself an advantage over which society can rejoice wisely. On the contrary, it is the fount and origin of many evils. Liberty is a power perfecting man, and hence should have truth and goodness for its object . . . Therefore the State is acting against the laws and dictates of nature when it permits the licence of opinion and action to lead minds astray from truth, and souls astray from the practice of virtue' (*Immortale*).

Here, again, we have on the surface a logical confusion but, beneath, a clear principle. The logical confusion is obvious:

Who is to decide what is 'truth'? The State? — but in that case political power will decide abstract verity. The religious bodies? — in that case, they all decide diversely. In reality, however, what the Pope means is that the Roman Church, when in power, will call on the State to treat, as 'straying from truth,' whatever is against itself. This is clear from such declarations as the following:

> 'With the discernment of a true Mother, the Church weighs the great burden of human weakness, and well understands the course down which the minds and actions of men are being borne in this our age. For this reason, while not conceding any right to anything save what is true and honest, she does not forbid public authority to tolerate what is at variance with truth and justice, for the sake of avoiding some greater evil, or obtaining and preserving some greater good . . . But, to judge aright, we must acknowledge that the more a State is driven to tolerate evil the farther it is from perfection; and that the tolerance of evil, which is dictated by political prudence, should be confined strictly to the limits which its justifying cause, the public welfare, requires' (*Libertas*).

(In this passage, of course, the word 'evil' has a special meaning. It includes anything contrary to Roman Catholic teaching in faith or morals; for example, it would include Protestant propaganda in Italy.)

The Papal ideal of a State, then, is a community agreeing with the Roman Catholic faith, professing it, tolerating dissent as little as possible, and whose civil laws, so far as they touch faith or morals, are subject to approval by the ecclesiastical power: in the last resort, by the Pope.

Turning from such basic principles to more detailed matters of politics and economics, we find that here also the Popes have definite teaching. While (as already seen) in general the Papacy does not commit itself to either favouring or censuring any particular mode of government — provided it does not transgress what the Roman Church holds to be truths of faith or morals — yet there are some theories which the Popes condemn as opposed to those truths. For example, Socialism and Communism. Socialism the Popes censure because (they contend) it is 'unjust, for it would rob the lawful possessor and distort the functions of the State' (Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum;* also others of his encyclicals — and the present Pope's *Quadragesimo*):

> 'Socialism cannot be brought into harmony with the dogmas of the Catholic Church, even after it has yielded to truth and justice in the points we have mentioned; the reason being that it conceives human society in a way utterly alien from Christian truth.'

Communism is condemned for similar reasons, and also as actively hostile to religion. (The present Pope, Letter to Cardinal Pompili, February 2, 1930; also other declarations.)

With regard to general economics, the Popes advocate a more just distribution of wealth:

> 'By degrees it has come to pass that working men have been surrendered, isolated and helpless, to the hard-heartedness of employers and the greed of unchecked competition'; and one of the evils of our times is 'the enormous fortunes of some few individuals and the utter poverty of the masses' (Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum*).

The Popes advocate fair wages, and condemn undue wage-cutting as sinful (*Rerum Novarum; cf.* the present Pope's *Quadragesimo*). They advocate an extension of small-ownership.

> 'The law should favour ownership, and its policy should be to induce as many as possible of the people to become owners' (*Rerum Novarum*).

While recognizing the legitimacy of trade-unions, they declare that such unions should be based on religious principles (*Rerum Novarum*; see also same Pope [Leo XIII's] *Graves de Communi*, 'on Christian democracy': 1901). This introduces an obvious confusion: for the members of trade-unions seldom agree on theology; but it gives opportunity for the Roman Church to intervene.

The Papal teaching recognizes that strikes sometimes may be necessary, but the contention is advanced that the need could be avoided if the State safeguarded the interests of the workers. (See Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum*, and the present Pope, Pius XI, *Ubi Arcano Dei*, 'on the troubles left by the European War': 1922.)

On divorce, artificial birth-control, and sterilization, the formal Papal teaching is definitely condemnatory so far as first appearances go; and it glorifies family-life in itself and as the basis of the State. (Leo XIII, *Arcanum Divinae*, and the present Pope [Pius XI], *Casti Connubii*—'on Christian marriage': 1930.) In the latter document the principle is affirmed that

> 'Christ our Lord raised matrimony to the rank of a true and great sacrament of the New Law, restoring it to its original purity of Divine institution and entrusting all its discipline and care to His spouse, the [Roman] Church.'

The Roman Church, it must never be forgotten, claims juris-

diction over the essentials of matrimony in the case of *all baptised persons*: on the principle that their marriages are sacramental and she is the sole guardian of the Sacraments. Her recognition, in the 1907 decree *Ne Temere*, of the validity of marriages of 'non-Catholics, contracting among themselves,' was no contradiction of that claim on her part. In the eyes of her canon-law she was merely making an indulgence owing to circumstances: she allowed the validity of such unions because they are too numerous to be denied: and the very fact of recognizing them implies a claim, on her part, to do so or not — in short, to be the rightful judge of the matter.

While, however, at first sight the Papal teachings seem rigidly adverse to divorce and artificial birth-control, that impression turns out, on closer inspection, to need qualification. It is taught that in no circumstances can a validly contracted, consummated marriage be dissolved; and therefore divorce is not recognized — but the conditions for a valid marriage include various impediments which may result in its being null, and thus *nullity* may be declared. For example, if both or either of the parties had a 'wrong intention.' These conditions have resulted often in cases indistinguishable from divorce. With regard to birth-control, the Roman Church condemns it if it involves the use of mechanical devices; but here again matters are not so clear as at first sight they seem. In his encyclical *Casti Connubii* (1930), the present Pope, Pius XI, declared that

> 'any use whatsoever of matrimony exercised so that the act is deliberately frustrated in its natural power to generate life is an offence against the law of God and nature.'

However, a few lines further on he added:

> 'Those are not considered as acting against nature who, in the married state, use their right in a proper manner, although, on account of natural reasons either of time or of natural defects, new life cannot be brought forth.'

This seems to admit the very principle just denied.

With regard to education, the Roman Church claims paramountcy.

> 'It is the inalienable right and indispensable duty of the Church to watch over the entire education of her children in all institutions, public or private, not merely in regard to the religious teaching, but in regard to every other branch of learning and all regulations so far as faith and morals are concerned' (the present Pope, encyclical *Rappresentanti* — 'on the education of youth' — 1929).

The Popes are under no illusion as to the possibilities of yet approaching fulfilment of their ideals.

> 'We cannot hope for so great a good, at least in its full measure . . . But the Church, throughout her long history, has always and on all occasions luminously shown that she possesses a wonderful power of adaptation to the varying conditions of human society. Without injury to the integrity or immutability of faith or morals, and always safeguarding her sacred rights, she easily lends or adapts herself to all that is contingent and accidental, to the vicissitudes of time and the fresh needs of society' (Pius X, *motu proprio 'Fin dalla Prima'*—'on Christian social action'—1903).

As this article is merely explanatory of facts, elaborate comment is needless; but of course, in considering Papal social teaching, we must bear in mind always that that teaching is the doctrine of a Church which regards herself as alone the authorized messenger, on this earth, of Divine verity, and other religious bodies—or philosophical bodies differing from her creed—as having, as such, no right to exist, being tolerated (*when* tolerated) merely for reasons of expediency. This assumption logically vitiates much of the Papal teaching; but in practice it would have this result: if in power, the Roman Church would be intolerant and disturbing to the State: and the latter not so much because she champions the freedom of individuals, as because she claims power superior to the State's.

With regard to War and Peace, the Papal teaching is vague. On the outbreak of the European War in 1914, the then Pope (Pius X) issued an encyclical (*Ad Beatissimi*, November 1, 1914) in which he deplored it in eloquent terms:

> 'On every side the dread phantom of war holds sway; there is scarce room for another thought in the minds of men . . . The arts are reduced to inactivity; the wealthy are in difficulties; the poor are reduced to misery; all are in distress.'

He ended by this appeal:

> 'It remains for us to raise our voice in supplication to God, and in the name of the whole human race to cry out, "Grant, O Lord, peace in our day."'

Similar sentiments were expressed by his successor, Benedict XV: who, indeed, on August 1, 1917, made concrete proposals for the cessation of the war. The present Pope (*Ubi Arcano Dei*, December, 1922) has been equally eloquent: 'Peace,' he said, 'indeed was signed between the belligerents, but it was written in public documents, not in the hearts of men.'

Notwithstand such eloquent words, the plain fact remains, however, that on the subject of war Roman Catholic teaching is so vague as to have little or no practical meaning. Let anyone read the article, 'War,' in the *Catholic Encyclopaedia*. The maze of maxims and qualifications conveys a sense of bewilderment. It says that the Church 'concedes to the State a perfect right to use physical force.' Father E. Masterson, S.J., in a pamphlet on War in the *Catholic Social Action* series, said the same; as did Father J. Keating, S.J. (Catholic Truth Society pamphlet, *Catholicism and War*). This, however, is a mere abstract principle concerning the theoretical rights of an abstract entity, 'The State.' In regard to actual practice, Roman Catholic teaching leaves us unguided. Father Masterson said that 'no reason short of necessity' could justify a State in using its right to wage war; also that, in a war, 'both sides may, quite sincerely, think themselves right.' So each will think itself 'necessarily' right war: a fact which may be interpreted in two contrary ways: either that both may fight or that neither may! The simple truth is that the history of the Roman Church makes it unable to give serious advice in this matter: for it has supported and even incited so many wars that it cannot enunciate any maxim condemnatory of war; yet its claim to represent Divine Charity compels it verbally to express general opposition to war. It has no useful guidance to give. The Italo-Ethiopian war is a case in point.

To conclude—while the Papal teaching on social matters contains many good and useful maxims, they are spoiled by the fact that the autocratic outlook of the Papacy, and its habit of vague generalities, leave it in a position to come down on either side of the fence in emergencies. No teaching can be derived from it, in any case, which is equal to the far-reaching nature of its claims on the allegiance of individuals and States. Neither can it be said that the Papal teaching is a check on State-absolutism. It is no such check in Austria, where it upholds—as it did in the past—dictatorship. It is no real check in Italy: indeed, the Papacy (so soon as it felt assured of Fascist permanence) came into alliance with political dictatorship. The weakness of the Papacy against political despotism arises from the fact that the Papacy is not opposed *in principle* to political

despotism; further, a spiritual autocracy can never be a real friend to freedom *as* freedom.

* Since the foregoing article was written, a book has been published by Jonathan Cape entitled *The Genius of the Vatican*. The author—a well-known Roman Catholic publicist who for some years has used the pen-name 'Robert Sencourt'—treats the general subject of the political, social and religious influence of the Papacy, and quotes numerous encyclicals of Popes. It is a clever book, but obviously a piece of apologetic special pleading. Its allusions to the Temporal Power should be compared with criticisms made of that Power when still in real existence as a territorial sovereignty (for example, with Edmond About's *The Roman Question*, published in 1859). Mr. Sencourt quotes Papal encyclicals in the most favourable way, so it is not surprising that (p. 160) he reaches this conclusion: 'Taken as a whole, the collections of the Vatican suggest not only the inspiration of the Catholic religion but, through a profound, sweeping, and age-long study, an understanding of the spirit and genius of man.' This requires to be qualified thus: An understanding thereof, *so far as foregone dogmatic assumptions permit, those assumptions permanently confining the Papal appeal to a minority of humanity, and causing it to restrict unduly the mentality even of that minority.*

Books recommended:—*The Pope and the People: Collected Papal Letters*; Catholic Truth Society, London. *Catholic Social Doctrine*, by V. M. Crawford; Catholic Social Guild, Oxford. *Codex Juris Canonici* (New Code of Latin Canon Law); and *Indice dei Libri Proibiti* (Index of Forbidden Books); both published by The Vatican Press and obtainable from any Roman Catholic Bookseller. *On Liberty*, by J. S. Mill.

J. W. Poynter.

THE SACREDNESS OF LIFE AS A MODERNIST SEES IT

By the Editor.

NATURE knows nothing of sacredness or sanctity of life. Nature is prolific in its production of life: prodigal in its use of life: ruthless in its destruction of life. For every thousand seeds of life which Nature produces barely one survives to the adult and reproductive stage.

Religion is dominated by the sense of the sacredness of life. That is what we might expect, for the sense of sacredness—universal sacredness—is the dominant note of religion. Ethics—the product of the co-operation of man's moral and rational

consciousness — is more discriminating than Nature and Religion. The Christian is accustomed to think only of *human* life as sacred. The Buddhist regards all animal life as sacred — including that of the most noxious insects. Similar to the tenets of the Buddhists were the views of the Manichees. Simple savages, before killing a domestic animal, have a custom of addressing a little prayer to it asking its consent to and forgiveness of the execution about to be carried out — just as a Tudor headsman might ask on the scaffold the forgiveness of some illustrious victim of our high treason laws.

And although the Buddhists do not, I think, extend their sense of the sanctity of life beyond animal life, more primitive peoples have done so, and I believe still do so. Before some giant of the forest primaeval is felled with stone axes a prayer is addressed to it, similar to that addressed to the domestic animal of more civilized peoples. There may well have been a time in the distant past when all life—human, animal and vegetable—was regarded as sacred. Those types of primitive religion known as naturism, animism and totemism, as exhibited in the worship of rocks and streams, trees and animals, seem to prove this. And the modern Englishman has much in common in this respect with the primitive savage. He is disposed to regard all life as sacred, save that which is venomous or ferocious. He has no hesitation in killing a shark or a mosquito. The killing of such creatures gives the modern man a rational and moral satisfaction such as we may believe St. Hilda felt when she turned those serpents into fossil ammonites, still preserved in the cliffs of Whitby.

But this moral satisfaction does not extend to the killing of evil and vicious *men*. Why is this? This is because the modern man has been taught that evil and vicious men may, by education and a good environment, be rendered virtuous and benevolent, and that it is better, although much more troublesome, to do this for them than to kill them. Moreover, if he takes the view of the Pope in Browning's poem,[1] and holds that executing them (like corporal punishment of a cruel and selfish child) may prove the best means of moral reform, yet he does it, or witnesses it, with repugnance, and regrets it, as somehow the less

[1] *The Ring and the Book.*

excellent way of dealing with moral evil. Nevertheless he is ready, or is driven to consent, that though not ideally or theoretically the *best* method of acting, it is *practically* the best, for it effectively puts an end to the activities of a creature which is a source of agony and death to *other* creatures. The humane emotion of the modern man, which makes him disposed to regard all life, human, animal and vegetable, as *sacred*, has thus in this case yielded to the pressure of his reason and moral consciousness, and has admitted that life is not so sacred but that it may be taken for rational and moral reasons.

In this connection, I would add, that if a community is morally justified in taking the life of one of its members in order to protect itself from intolerable wrong and injury, it is also morally justified in taking the lives of members of other communities for the same reason. The right to execute criminals and the right to wage defensive wars are on the same footing.

Having dealt with the rational and moral right to deprive harmful and venomous creatures of their lives, I now pass to another reason for killing. This concerns creatures which are *not* harmful and venomous, but may be made the means of sustaining the life of other creatures. Is such a practice rationally and morally justifiable? Not in every case.

It seems to us that only the less precious life may be sacrificed to sustain the more precious. We judge of the value of a life by its position in the scale of biological evolution. Vegetable lives may be sacrificed to maintain animal lives; vegetable and animal lives may be sacrificed to maintain human lives.

But can we stop with this vague generalisation? Must we not consider the claims of species and of genera in relation to each other? The lower species may be sacrificed for the sustenance of the higher species — of plants, yes; of animals, yes; but what about human beings? In the struggle for existence, may the higher races (for instance, the Nordic) sacrifice the lower races—the Australian black, the negro, the Hottentot, the Patagonian, the Eskimo? If our principle be sound we must answer, Yes, certainly if the necessity arises; otherwise evolution would be checked and even turned into retrogression.

But here a moral difficulty arises which did not trouble Nietzsche. Christianity commends, as the highest ideal of ethical

action, the principle of self-sacrifice for others; self-sacrifice, not of the less valuable for the more valuable, but of the more valuable for the less valuable. What are we to say to this?

The impulse which prompts the higher or more precious to sacrifice itself for the lower or less precious is the outcome of a sound social practice. In a community whether of men or animals the safety and protection of any member of that community becomes the duty of every other member of that community. It is simply on the ground that he is a member of the community, even though it be the most worthless member of it, that the most valued member of it is willing to give his life for him. This self-sacrifice of the highest for the lowest is the assertion of the duty of social loyalty and social unity. It was because Jesus Christ was one with humanity that He could rightly give His life for the meanest of men.

To this reversal is there any limit? Is it right, rationally and morally, that, for instance, a man should sacrifice his life for that of a favourite dog? To many there may be something sentimentally inspiring in such a sacrifice, but as rational and moral creatures we cannot feel that it is justifiable. We restrict this kind of sacrifice of life to creatures within the human species. Is this due to the influence of our traditional belief in the sacrifice of Jesus Christ for the human race alone, and not also for that sub-human animal world, or is there some rational justification for this contention?

The biologist will remind us that the distinction between the brute world and the human world is a very indefinite one; that a very intelligent and affectionate dog may have more of rationality and morality in him than an anthropoid ape or the owner of the Pekin skull.

The answer to this kind of argument is surely this, that however indefinite the distinction in some cases, there is a clear general distinction between man and the brute, and that the lowest type of man has rational and moral and spiritual potentialities which none of our existing species of animals possess. Hence, on rational and moral grounds, we can only admit the rightfulness of sacrificing a human life *for* a human life. Some may here raise the issue of a future life, and argue that only if there be a future life for the person sacrificing his life for another

is he rationally justified in making that sacrifice. I hold, however, that quite apart from this issue of a future life, the sacrifice of the higher for the lower within the limits defined is justifiable. It is really, as I have indicated, a sacrifice offered on the altar of social love.

But in the light of this conclusion we must glance again at the case of the criminal man. May the human pest, and menace to human well-being and virtue, be rightly deprived of life?

There are three options: (1) Execution; (2) perpetual segregation; (3) reform and transformation. Practically there are excellent reasons for capital punishment, but as humanity produces fewer and fewer criminals, increasing endeavours should be made to substitute segregation and reformation for execution. But only experiment can indicate which of the three options should be practised in any community. When criminality is on the increase in a community, we must have capital punishment; when criminality is on the decline, segregation and reformation may be substituted.

Here there is a special instance to be considered. The ancient Greek and Roman world regarded the tyrannicide who deprived his country's tyrant of his life as a moral hero. I believe their judgment was sound, but modern men in their horror of political assassination seem to shrink from acknowledging this. Yet the assassination of a tyrant brings much less ill upon a community than a civil war, or the continuance of his tyrannies.

But, irrespective of our decision on the tyrannicide issue, the general conclusion to which we are driven is this, that a human life *may* be taken when it is for the welfare of the community to take it. The sound democratic principle of 'the greatest good of the greatest number' compels this in the interests of social and moral progress.

But it is of supreme importance morally that the individual so executed should see his execution in the right light.

Here it is not amiss to refer to the duty of chaplains attending condemned criminals. The first duty of the chaplain is to get the criminal to confess his crime and to acknowledge the dreadful character of it and the rightness of his execution for it. His second duty is to try to secure such a spirit in the criminal that he willingly offers his life in a spirit of sacrifice for the good

of his community. This will constitute the criminal's atonement for his crime.

I now pass to the consideration of the case of suicide.

Martyrdom, or the sacrifice of one's life for a cause or principle, might be regarded as a form of suicide, but this act is justified on the moral ground, that great causes and great principles are of greater value to humanity's welfare than individual human lives, and so human lives may be sacrificed for them.

Has a man moral and rational justification for taking his own life? I should reply, Yes, if the prolongation of his life is a source of danger, pain and grief to others. I think his suicide is a heroic act in such a case, a form of Christian self-sacrifice. We all think that in the case of Captain Oates.

But suppose this prolongation of life is not a cause of danger, pain and grief to others, but only of intolerable agony to himself? Is he then justified in committing suicide? Many will say, No. He must abide by God's Will. He must not take the law into his own hands. But this decision is based on the view that God has really given us a precise rule which we must obey in such cases, rather than that God makes His Will known to reason and conscience through our experience of life, by means of those natural sequences known as laws, physical, chemical, biological and psychological. Where the impulse to take one's life is overwhelmingly strong, why not regard that as an expression of the Divine Will?

The Stoics, no cowards or weaklings, regarded it as the Divine Signal of Retreat from the mortal scene. Am I to believe that it is more the Will of God that I should die a raving lunatic, the consequence of exhausting and agonising torture, than that I should die sanely, and peacefully, and deliberately, as the result of an opiate administered by myself? I can see no rational and moral reason against this.

Some will say: Jesus Christ, our Pattern, refused to drink the myrrhed wine before His crucifixion. There might, I think, be special reasons in His case. I think we cannot soundly argue from this special case. There were many religious people who thought it wrong to be put under an anaesthetic until Sir James Simpson cited the case of Jehovah causing a deep sleep to fall on Adam before He took the rib from his side to form Eve.

General principles based upon a comprehensive human experience are a more secure guide in these difficult matters than Biblical texts and instances.

May others take the life of one suffering from a mortal and agonising complaint or accident?

I should answer, Yes, if he cannot himself take his own life, and if he most earnestly and undoubtedly asks that it may be taken. I cannot bring myself to believe that God, if He be, as the Christian religion teaches, a loving spiritual Father, should wish it otherwise.

What about the case of lunatics in hopeless agony who have not intelligence enough to take their own lives, or to ask that they may be taken for them? I should reply that it is morally right to take their lives in such a case, just as we put a poor dumb animal out of its misery; but, of course, only after medical and judicial authorities have so determined.

There is another reason to be considered for taking life, namely, taking life for sport. Is this justifiable?

Some have argued that because the pleasure given to the person taking the life is so much greater than the pain given to the creature whose life is taken, therefore it is morally justifiable. I must say I cannot agree with this argument, for no moral being can rightly feel pleasure in the taking of life unless that life be taken to save or protect the lives of others. If the fox or tiger or any animal hunted be of this kind, then its being hunted is morally justifiable. If the hunting of an animal be necessary in order to secure it as food, then it is morally justifiable. But the hunting of an animal for pure sport, the zest of catching and killing it, cannot I think be justified morally. I think Wordsworth's advice is sound:

> 'Never to blend our pleasure or our pride
> With anguish of the meanest thing that feels.'

The taking of life for whatever cause should be as painless as possible for the creature killed.

There is yet another reason for taking life, namely, in the cause of science—to advance medical and surgical knowledge.

I hold this is justifiable. It is an aspect of that sacrifice of the lower for the higher, but I need hardly add that it should only be exacted when absolutely necessary and with all possible humanity.

Procreation.

But man has not only the power to take life and the power to shorten or prolong life, he has the power to procreate life.

Is it his duty to do this in every case, if the opportunity offers itself?

So far as I know this has never been insisted on in the case of men, although women in ancient societies were in many cases compelled to be mothers. To-day it is certainly recognized that parenthood should not be compulsory, but voluntary.

Ought married people, whose health is sound and who are without physical or mental defects, to have children, if their means permit them to bring up their children under good conditions?

Most certainly they should. It is their duty to their community. But in that case should not physically and mentally sound adults, who can afford to marry, do so and procreate children?

The Christian religion has never taught this as an obligation, and has even taught, but without the authority of Christ and His Apostles, that in the case of those performing certain kinds of religious duties, they ought not to marry.

If, so it seems to me, we are to insist that it is a moral duty for the married to procreate children, I do not think we can withhold stressing the obligation of similar people to marry, if they can marry without being unhappy, and without interfering with their vocations and labours — for a life's vocation has, I think, morally higher claims than marriage and procreation. One sees that in the case of Jesus Christ, Gautama, St. Paul, St. Francis of Assisi: so in a Spinoza, a Pascal, and a Joseph Butler. On the other hand, it must have been a great loss to social and moral progress in Europe in the Middle Ages that so many of the best men and women became monks and nuns.

Should not the domestic life, and the duty to procreate children, be enforced except in special circumstances as a moral duty in the case of all able to do it advantageously to the community? I think that the communities of the future would take this view unless they valued a large measure of individual freedom as more conducive to good citizenship than legal compulsion in the general interest of the community.

Should sexual intercourse only take place between the married? This is the ideal of the Christian religion, and it is socially advantageous that this should be so; prostitution, irregular and promiscuous sexual intercourse, the bearing of children out of wedlock, are socially disadvantageous. It is much better, therefore, in the interests of the community that sexual intercourse should be restricted to the married, and that, in accordance with the Christian ideal, marriage should be a monogamous, life-long union, except in such exceptional cases as that one of the partners should become insane, venereally diseased, or criminally vicious, so that the life, health and happiness of the other partner is seriously endangered.

In this question of sexual relations, besides the welfare of the individuals themselves, there is also the welfare of their offspring and of their community to be considered, and welfare, from the Christian point of view, includes not simply physical but also moral welfare. This has to be taken into consideration when judging of reasons for divorce and the claim to contract voluntarily terminable sexual unions.

Should sexual intercourse between the married only take place with the definite purpose of procreation?

Certainly not, if there is a desire on the part of the partners of the marriage that it should be otherwise. In normal marriage sexual relations constitute a factor—and perhaps a not unimportant factor—in married happiness and welfare, and simply on those grounds, and not solely because they can be used for purposes of procreation, sexual relations are permissible.

The Christian view of the Creator is that He is a God of Love, that the creative process originated from love, is directed by love, and finds its consummation in love. That, as the pastoral Epistle expresses it, God has given us 'all things richly to enjoy.' Therefore enjoyment, in and for itself, is permissible.

Of course, if that joy or pleasure be shared with others, this is better than its own selfish enjoyment. If it be entirely sacrificed or foregone, to give pleasure to others, this is best of all. This better and best cannot, however, enter into the case of sexual relations of two married persons; they are enjoyed mutually, or not enjoyed; they cannot be either shared or sacrificed so as to give pleasure to others. Therefore I should hold that

sexual intercourse without any purpose of procreation is morally right. Of course, such intercourse must be governed by considerations of health, mental, moral and spiritual. There is an apostolic phrase, 'as heirs together of the grace of life, that your prayers be not hindered,' which might serve as a motto.

Bishop Jeremy Taylor in his *Holy Living* has some sound advice for married people from this standpoint.

Taking the view that sexual intercourse by married people is right without any intention of procreation, the question arises what must be the relation of sexual intercourse to procreation. Ought all married people also to use it for procreation? If they are thoroughly healthy, if they can afford to bring up and educate a child, at least as well as they have been brought up and educated themselves, then they would procreate one child or more.

Reason should enter in and decide when the child is to be procreated, so that unwanted children be not born, nor unhealthy children or children which cannot be properly brought up, and I should hold that contraceptives (medical men must decide of what kinds) may be used to prevent undesired conception.

I would add that the community has the moral right by means of sterilization to take steps to prevent the procreation of the mentally defective and physically diseased. It is, however, morally important that the victim of these measures should, if *compos mentis*, be brought beforehand to acknowledge the moral rightfulness of them and to submit himself voluntarily and sacrificially to them.

We now approach the question of abortion. Whilst the use of contraceptives and the consequent destruction or waste of vital semen seems to me under certain conditions rationally and morally justifiable, and while infanticide fills me with horror and repulsion, I find it no easy matter to deal with abortion, which comes between the two. Assuming that abortion can be procured without danger to the mother, then I hold it should only be procured in the case where the birth of a child should threaten serious danger to the mother's health or life, or where the offspring would in all probability be defective, and that it should only be procured by duly licensed medical practitioners.

I recognize the extreme seriousness of the character of the conclusions adumbrated here. The reader of Lecky's *History of European Morals* will at once recognize some of these conclusions as pagan rather than Christian, but such a verdict does not stamp them as necessarily wrong. A belief in the everlasting damnation of unbaptized infants did more, so Lecky indicates, to prevent infanticide among Christians than did those considerations of humanity which deter us to-day.

It is the motive which determines for the doer the rightness or wrongness of an action. The Christian motive is the duty of doing God's Will. 'Thy will be done on earth' is his prayer. The Bible to which his fathers went for guidance gives him no precise directions here, and the Church seems out of date.

The primitive Christian regarded Nature as the expression of the Mind and Will of God in a way which is quite impossible for the modern Englishman since the delivery of Huxley's famous Romanes Lecture. The whole conception of the creative process and the methods by which it evolves, and of man's relation to it as a fellow-worker with God, have given the modern man an entirely different view of the Will of God and the kind of obedience which it would appear God requires from him in the light of this new knowledge.

'New truth makes ancient good uncouth.'

Our inherited life-taboos still exert their influence over us, though a waning one, as we reflect on the sacredness of life. Life is sacred for rational and moral beings because of its potentialities, and it is sacred in the sense that it may not be taken without moral and rational justification; it is also sacred because in its highest human form it can be, and ought to be, consecrated to the service of God and man. For the Christian, however, the supreme thing is not the sacredness of life but the sacredness of human personality, which under human limitations is the Divine Nature itself.

IN MEMORIAM—WILLIAM JAMES MANN

On January 26th there passed away at the age of 86 the Rev. W. J. Mann, a member of the Churchmen's Union and one of the last survivors of the Broad-Church party of the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

He was ordained in 1873 and spent a few years as curate to a once famous Broad-Church clergyman in the slums, Prebendary Harry Jones, Vicar of St. George's-in-the-East. His talent for church music was soon discovered, and he held in succession a minor canonry at three cathedrals, Carlisle, Winchester, and Bristol. At Bristol he spent most of his ministry, first as Precentor of the Cathedral from 1882 to 1896, and then as Vicar of St. Thomas' from 1896 to 1915. St. Thomas' is a city church with scarcely any resident population in the parish; but under Mr. Mann the dignified eighteenth century building became a centre of liberal theology and refined music where on Sunday evenings large numbers found a spiritual home. When Mr. Mann went to St. Thomas' the Broad-Church school had not many representatives in Bristol, though they included during his incumbency such men as Canon John Gamble at Leigh Woods and afterwards at the Cathedral, Canon Haigh at St. Paul's, Clifton, and Archdeacon Talbot (afterwards Dean of Rochester) at the Cathedral. Of this group Mr. Mann was the last survivor. The writer of this notice, then a curate in Clifton, made Mr. Mann's acquaintance in 1912, when a Bristol branch of the Churchmen's Union was formed; on many occasions he preached at St. Thomas', and was impressed by its combination of liberal teaching in the pulpit with a choral service of the Cathedral type that was never allowed to degenerate into a concert.

Mr. Mann resigned the living in 1915 owing to failing health; he survived his retirement for twenty years, during which he lived in London. He recovered his health sufficiently to be able to preach occasionally and to do some war work; but latterly he became more or less of an invalid and shared the obscurity that often befalls a man who has outlived his own generation.

J. F. Clayton.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE GOSPEL OF MODERNISM*

This book was welcomed by the *Modern Churchman* when it was first published in September, 1933. It was an admirable statement of the modernist position, but it was very much more than that. It set out clearly what most scholars would regard as a true view of the results of the modern study of the Gospels in their bearing on the history of the beginnings of the Christian religion, and it presented the new picture with a restrained but truly evangelical fervour as a real Gospel for men and women to-day.

Writers who belong to an older school of religious thought may wish that such teaching as Mr. Richardson gives was not legitimate in the Church of England. The plain fact is that it has been recognized as legitimate since the early summer of 1914. No doubt in centuries past such teaching would have brought men to the stake. But in centuries past such teaching was simply impossible. The knowledge of various kinds which has led to it, which undermined and overthrew the supports and framework

* *The Gospel of Modernism.* By R. D. Richardson (London. Skeffington and Son: Second edition. 1935. Price 6/-,)

of traditional Christian theology, did not exist. It is this new knowledge that justifies the new setting of the old Gospel that Mr. Richardson gives. It does much more than justify it. The Gospel requires a new setting of this kind if Christianity is still to be able to rest on a firm historical basis.

What gives special value to this new edition are three appendices on 'The essential modernism of the Church of England,' 'The Resurrection of Jesus,' and 'Our unchanging faith and the unchanging Creeds.' Here we have some sixty pages of historical exposition, exegesis and criticism, and religious pleading, from which it would be a pleasure to quote at length. I differ from many of my 'modernist' friends as to the usefulness of trying to compose substitutes for the ancient Creeds, but I would warmly recommend everyone who values the first edition of Mr. Richardson's book to possess himself of the second also, for the sake of the new appendices. The first of them in particular might, I think, with great advantage, be circulated far and wide.

The following extracts from this appendix will give some idea of its scope and quality.

Evolution or Dualism?

(p. 245.) 'Faced by the challenge of evolution then—and the last Archbishop of Canterbury (Dr. Randall Davidson) having publicly informed the Bishop of Birmingham (Dr. E. W. Barnes) that the Church of England accepts and teaches that theory of man's origin — our Church must now take its stand upon the higher Reason as its ultimate authority and the avenue of Revelation.

Refusal to admit this conclusion explicilty, now that it has become obvious, partakes at once of the nature of a reversal to a more primitive religious type, throwing us back to the pre-Reformation view of religion and denying the evolution that has taken place in Christianity. It destroys the monistic, organically inclusive, view of things which we have reached, and plunges us back into the old dualism of nature and super-nature, of God on this side and the world on that. In such a refusal man's nature is no longer thought of as spiritual. His religious side is separated from the rest. But so separated, so cut off from the other voices of life and of experience, it becomes a rank wilderness which may invade the whole personality, breeding superstitions and fancies, as we see by the present attraction of Romanism, by the spread of fanciful religious cults, and by the presence of sacramental superstition within our own Church — for the human heart will not be denied, and the unseen world must needs be near it in one way or another. Or again, the effect may be different. The separation may be accepted and formulated, as when Loisy and the Continental Modernists tried to save both religion and intellect by differentiating the Jesus of history whom their intellect had discovered from the Christ on whom the Church had fixed their faith; or when Giordano Bruno long ago asserted that as a priest he could believe what the Inquisition wanted, but that as a philosopher he must believe something else. This position the Roman Church rejected, in both instances, but it must be increasingly forced upon her members if discipline compels them to accept her teachings unchanged.'

The Thirty-nine Articles.

(p. 235.) 'Because the Prayer Book, which includes within it the Thirty-nine Articles, is the only authoritative expression of the mind of the Church of England, let us examine its teaching. . . . Inasmuch

as the Articles set forth some doctrines which form no part of medieval theology, it is to these innovations we must look if we would know the distinctive doctrinal position of the Church of England, the grounds of her claim to leave the Church of Rome behind. That there are medievalisms in the Articles is not disputed, but Christianity, as an evolving religion, is not to be expected at any one stage to have left all survivals behind at once. There remain in the Articles vestigial structures, as it were, and more than one useless 'appendix,' which now require excision. But, to change the metaphor, no medievalisms pour in upon us from the Articles. As was pointed out by the American scholar, Dr. Carl Grammar, in a striking essay on the Articles years ago, the real sources of medieval infiltrations in the Church of England to-day are those extravagant views of Church authority and of the magical efficacy of sacraments which the Articles roundly condemn. To drop the Thirty-nine Articles from the formularies of the Church of England would, at the present juncture, be to rob her of her Reformation aspect.'

THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

(p. 223.) 'If then the constitution of the Church of England is essentially Modernist, as we hold it to be, this will be evident in two ways during the period when she organized herself in deliberate independence of the Church of Rome: first in her attitude towards new knowledge then lately discovered — according as she regarded it as leading men nearer to God, or not; and secondly in her attitude towards the question of authority in Religion — according as she gave Reason a place above the traditions of the Church, or not.'

(p. 240.) 'The Church of England has a doctrinal position of her own, and one in which lie the seeds of progress on the lines followed by her loyal Modernist members to-day. There is no room for doubt as to her essentially Modernist mind.'

(p. 246.) 'As for the Church of England, whatever be the narrowness of some among her children; whatever, indeed, the well-intentioned blindness of some among her leaders; she must, in this our day, openly admit Modernism as her own. The time is short. The reforms which Modernism involves are long overdue. Soon it may be too late and the main stream of religious evolution will have passed from the historic Churches. Can it be that the Church of England is ever to be numbered with those Churches which "have a name that they live, but they are dead"; that she will be remembered among those "little systems that have their day and cease to be"? Rather, at every crisis of Divine Revelation may she hear, as the Reformers heard, the voice of the Spirit sounding in her ears, "Arise, shine, for thy light is come" . . .'

(p. 232.) 'New truth is long in spreading: longer still in making its significance fully known . . .' J. F. BETHUNE-BAKER.

GOD IN HISTORY*

What is the relation between religion and history is one of the most fascinating and important of contemporary questions. The answer given determines the character of a man's religion, and the giving of it necessitates a reconsideration of the nature of history and of history's presuppositions. Christians to-day face the question in an urgent form. In

* *The Historical Element in Religion.* The Lewis Fry Lectures. By C. C. J. Webb, M.B.A. (Allen and Unwin, 1935. 4/6.)

a lower sphere, the view taken of history is becoming increasingly the decisive factor in the new shaping of parties now taking place in the Church of England. Under the influence of the debate the boundaries of the old parties are vanishing, and their alignments with each other, shifting.

The reason is not far to seek. Christianity is an historical religion; Dr. Webb would say it is more so than any other religion. Its faith and practice are rooted in writings and traditions about the past, and, one school would hold, may only be justified by them. Therefore Christianity of all the religions is most deeply affected by the development during the last century of the modern historical method: in a word, by the new creation which is 'history' as modern men understand the term.

> '. . . within quite recent times . . . a revolution has taken place in the attitude of Christian scholars toward the writings which contain the narratives of those events to which Christians attach so high an importance. . . .
>
> '. . . what has happened is that the rise of a new ideal of historical knowledge has, by casting doubts upon the historical value of the traditional account of the origins of the Christian faith and life—which constituted the historical element in Christianity—raised in an acute form the question of the importance to that faith and life of this historical element' (pp. 48, 49).

Dr. Webb begins by enquiring into the exact significance of history for the religious man. He finds his answer in the nature of religion itself, an answer which, it should be observed, involves also a certain understanding of the nature of history.

> 'Now an historical element in religion . . . is an element in religion precisely in consequence of the social character which belongs to religion as a mode of behaviour or activity carried on by men as members of a community. . . . It belongs to the experience of becoming a member of a community . . . that one identifies oneself with it, and thinks of a past which one does not oneself remember as yet in some sense one's own because it was the community's. . . .'
>
> 'Religion, normally at any rate, is communal; and because communal, traditional; and, because traditional, historical; and, while it remains communal, it must remain traditional and therefore historical.'

As for Christianity, Dr. Webb points out, it possesses a sacred record of past revelation of God's nature and will, and, moreover, part of this record, the Old Testament, is a Jewish history of themselves and the world. Again, Christianity conceives of God

> 'as a transcendent Being communicating his will through the medium of prophets to whom he speaks directly and of a community to which is entrusted the message thus received.'

These two features, writes Dr. Webb, Christianity shares with some other religions; the third feature is distinctive. The Founder of Christianity was God Himself incarnate on earth, in the sphere of history, as man. The records concerning this Man, and the traditions liturgical and otherwise about Him, are therefore of supreme significance for Christianity, which thus stands or falls with its history.

In order briefly to present the remainder of Dr. Webb's argument we may notice the debaters of his question in their three classes. There are those who, on historical or literary-critical grounds, regard the traditions which Christianity cherishes as inaccurate in detail, maybe gravely, but none the less as true in all that ultimately matters; there are those who

gard the traditions as essentially false and who therefore abandon hristianity; and there are those who deny the relevance of history for ligion. In this last class are many who, perhaps in the light of a negative nclusion about what purports to be Christian history, contrive to abandon e history while calling themselves Christians and following the Christian ay within the Christian Church. Dr. Webb is chiefly concerned with the st class, and rightly so, for it is a rapidly growing one in the contemporary hurch. He takes 'as his text,' however, not one in this class who is ecifically a Christian apologist, but, and most valuably, Mr. Oakeshott's cent book, *Experience and its Modes*. Mr. Oakeshott writes:

> 'God in history is . . . a contradiction, a meaningless phrase. Wherever God is, he is not in history, for, if he were, there would no longer be any history. *God in History* indicates an incursion of the practical past into the historical past, an incursion which brings only chaos' (quoted on p. 64).

In a careful examination Dr. Webb points out that the philosopher who parates history from religion and philosophy from both, 'with a hatchet,' aves himself with a philosophy concerned with a 'truth' inconsistent with e facts of life, and upon which we must turn our backs in order to live. here vanishes the claim of philosophy to be a complete form of experience. urther, such a sharp separation of our modes of experience ignores the vious fact that all experience is that of a single co-ordinating personality who has the experience.'

With the second class of debaters Dr. Webb is not here concerned; ith the first, which thinks historical criticism has modified or denied the hristian tradition, but not essentially, Dr. Webb is clearly himself in mpathy. In a last chapter he considers the traditions of the Virgin Birth d of the Physical Resurrection of Christ, and while expressing no opinion the historical evidence, he finds the acceptance of neither of these traditions to be essential for the holding of the Christian faith or for the sharing the Christian experience. What is essential is that it should be true that sus was born and lived, and that certain members of the Early Church hould have had

> 'A genuine experience of intercourse with a living person victorious over death.'

Perhaps the most stimulating passages are those in which the author scusses the nature and evidential value of the *memory* of a community; at is, of the memory of the past which each individual in a community, ho shares its experience, inherits or acquires in this or that degree. haring the memory is a condition of sharing the experience of a community. Memory and experience are interwoven, and it is this interweaving hich gives to true religion its historical element. The Christian memory events, as tradition, has of course its own value for the historian, which e must estimate. But there is more to be said here:

> '. . . a distinguishable type of religious experience, renewed from age to age in a great variety of contexts . . . warrants those who share this experience . . . in affirming their belief in the reality of those historical antecedents without which its existence would be inexplicable.'

r. Webb's precise meaning here does not become clear, to one reader, nd we could wish he had been able to enlarge his small book at this int. His further discussion of memory in connection with what he says the Resurrection of Christ still leaves an ambiguous impression. Does r. Webb mean that our own experience of the Risen Christ is exactly hat of St. Paul? Or does he mean that St. Paul's experience, and that of

the more than five hundred to whom Jesus also appeared, was other than ours because sprung from an historical antecedent with which we have had no contact, though of it we have report? Again, can our 'distinguishable religious experience' tell us anything of value to an historian about the historical antecedents of that same experience in men now gone? How comes it that repeatedly in the history of Christianity men, in the very name of their experience, have cast off the traditions of their own Christian community, challenged its *memory*, and turned to other sources for their Christian history? To answer that Christians, while they remain so, never turn from essential tradition or memory only raises the whole matter afresh in the discussion of what is essential. Our religious experience, at least as to a part, and as we at first naturally have it within a community, is indeed linked with records, written or oral, of past events, and with past interpretations of those events: but it is not linked with those events themselves, and how are we then justified in thinking that by the light of our experience we can glean some information about those events which is not afforded by the traditional evidence for them? The point is, that the question only arises where the traditional evidence is disputable or conflicting. Our own experience may incline us to believe other men when they affirm such an experience to have been theirs, and may enable us sympathetically to know the quality of the experience they affirm. On the general ground that all experience is related to event, our own experience may indeed enable us to vouch that, when it first was had by men, 'something must have happened'; but can it tell us what happened, or so much as help us to decide upon the probabilities? Yet it is only in the question of *what* happened that the historian is interested: that *something* happened he will readily admit; indeed, this he must presuppose as a condition of his inquiry. A Physical Resurrection and Appearance, which disturbed material objects such as grave-clothes, may have been the event which evoked the religious experience of St. Paul; or it may have been the quickening of St. Paul's spirit by the Spirit of God in Christ, which in his heart, as in ours, gives to cry, Abba, Father. A man living, teaching, crucified and Ascended, may have been the ground of the Early Church's experience of Christ, which is also ours, or only the devout inventions of the Beloved Community. For one man to-day the tradition of the Virgin Birth may cast a piercing light on the Incarnation, and, for him, condition his whole 'distinguishable religious experience'; for another, the same tradition seems irrelevant to his understanding of the Incarnation and counter to his religious experience. There may be so many possible historical antecedents which make our religious experience explicable that it would seem the road starting from experience must lead to historical scepticism. Dr. Webb admits the legitimacy of the historical method applied to Christian tradition, and is plainly no sceptic, but this is to make a different approach, and it is this question of the approach to historical questions which is all-important.

There is the other starting-point. Suppose the Christian tradition about Christ be examined without appeal to our Christian experience, by the ordinary methods of historical investigation. If the tradition utterly breaks down, then, as Dr. Webb indeed maintains, Christianity is an illusion. But if the tradition, in its essentials, is established, then we are free, and now by our own experience, to interpret it, much as the first disciples interpreted not the tradition but the events. Thus justified, the tradition is now autonomous in its historicity and powerful to influence and shape our experience, already conditioned as it may be by the memory of our community. The force of history may even newly awaken Christian experience in us. But always the tradition is vouched for, not by our experience—when surely

it were of no effect upon experience—but by historical investigation according to our competency or that of historians whom we trust. Surely in the last resort, as in the first days, it is the evidence of history or of events, not of experience, which compels men to God in Christ? Surely the evangelical power of the historical element in religion is just that men, as historians, can discover for themselves that God has revealed Himself in the past, and thus come to look for His revelation now, and better understand it? Nor is the history of God's revelation a history of another order than that which is open to the natural sciences, but a history of our everyday world in which men experiment, and estimate probabilities, and err. What is peculiar to the Christian's outlook is that he sees God in Christ at work in this world, now and in the past; and in the last analysis it is because he sees this that he is a Christian, and it is not that he comes to see what he is anxious to find. It is this which renders the Christian faith also an assurance and a hope.

M.T.D.

PAPAL PROVISIONS*

The means by which the Papacy secured control over the appointment of a large proportion of the beneficed clergy during the Middle Ages, and the use made of this power, have been investigated by Mr. Barraclough with rare thoroughness, and the results of his researches, as summarised for the public in this attractively produced little volume, are of great interest. The subject is one that involves considerable knowledge of legal technicalities and of modern (especially German) scholarship; this the author brings to bear with great skill and effect, setting out his authorities in a bibliography of ten closely-printed pages which is specially valuable. He has shown convincingly how necessary some knowledge of papal administrative history (including the machinery by which Provisions were made) is for any complete understanding of the later Middle Ages and of the Reformation. The continuity of policy made possible by the experience and traditions of the papal *curia,* the general common sense and equitable principles which governed Papal action, the value of Provisions to University students and deserving ecclesiastical administrators are explained with convincing illustrative detail. Little attempt is made to estimate statistically the number of Provisions made annually or the rate at which they increased but Mr. Barraclough rightly points out that a great deal more local investigation into this matter is necessary. In particular, the extent and manner in which the recruitment of Cathedral Chapters was influenced by Papal action deserves further study in the light of the suggestions thrown out in this book, and the attention of local historians in England is worth diverting to this matter. Clearly, for example, the influence of certain noble families over individual chapters was never as extensive here as in Germany or the Low Countries.

Mr. Barraclough modestly and sensibly leaves a number of questions open (*e.g.* p. 49), claiming that the system of Provisions 'produced itself' (p. 165) and giving no clear indication as to how far the growing centralisation of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was the result of conscious policy or of force of circumstances. The main emphasis is on the legal side of this important aspect of the history of the Church and this has, probably unintentionally, caused the general trend of this essay to be to the effect that the Papacy, in making use of the tendencies of the age for its own advantage, was thereby furthering the best interests of the Church as a

* *Papal Provisions.* By Geoffrey Barraclough. (Oxford: Blackwell. 1935. 10/6 net.)

whole. This, however, ignores the extent to which the action of the Papacy might have been much more beneficial had a strong Pope made better use of the power and opportunities which law, custom, history and usurpation had placed in his hands.

G. R. POTTER.

ST. AMBROSE OF MILAN *

The Master of Pembroke College, Oxford, remarks in his preface to these two volumes on the circumstance that no English scholar has attempted hitherto a survey of the life and times of Ambrose of Milan. This lack has furnished his opportunity; and it should be said at once that he has seized it with both hands. His study not only fills an obvious gap in English historiography, but will take its proper place amongst European studies of its subject. Ambrose has been much more studied on the continent, and two years ago M. Palanque published his *St. Ambroise et l'Empire Romain,* beside which Dr. Homes Dudden's volumes will stand worthily. Furthermore, it is no small tribute to the author's researches to remember that he has recently filled the office of Vice-Chancellor of his University, and that he has sustained continuously the duties of Head of a House and residentiary Canon of Gloucester. Students of church history will accord a cordial welcome to his latest contribution in that field.

The life of the great bishop of Milan is itself of outstanding interest, from a wider standpoint than the purely biographical. The young Ambrose, after a providential escape from death in infancy when a swarm of bees alighted upon his face, is recorded to have observed in boyhood that he would become a bishop. But his career was directed instead towards the imperial civil service, and his initial residence at Milan was in the important and dignified position of Consular, or Governor, of the province of Aemilia-Liguria. There, suddenly and much against his will, upon the death of Auxentius in October 373, he was elected Bishop of that see, being present in the church in his civil capacity when a child's voice cried 'Ambrose, Bishop,' and the cry was taken up by the assembled people. Thus at the age of thirty-four and whilst yet unbaptized, his life was changed from the successful course of an eminent civil servant to the arduous office and work of a Christian bishop.

From that time until his death on Easter eve, 397, the life of Ambrose was a matter of public concern. Dr. Homes Dudden has wisely entitled his study the 'life and times' of Ambrose; and has allowed himself a sufficiently large canvas to give a full picture of the Roman and Italian world in which Ambrose's career was set. It is impossible indeed to divorce the great bishop from his age. Much of his importance lay in the circumstances of his age, and in his election to the see of Milan, which both in civil and ecclesiastical matters overshadowed contemporary Rome. Ambrose lived in that fourth century which saw the final victory of Christianity over Paganism, and of Catholicism over Arianism. Of both these episodes Dr. Dudden gives a full and detailed account; and also of the relations between Ambrose and the Emperors which they produced. It was Ambrose's fortune to be brought into more intimate relationship with Valentinian I and II, Gratian, and Theodosius than had been previously possible for the orthodox episcopate when the imperial rulers had been defenders of Arianism. Nor was his personal part in the suppression of paganism and Arianism in any wise slight or unimportant, as these volumes well testify.

* *The Life and Times of St. Ambrose.* By F. Homes Dudden. 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. London: Milford. 1935. 35/-.)

Dr. Dudden observes that the chief significance of Ambrose's episcopate 'lies in the fact that at this time was inaugurated that new relationship between church and state which is so conspicuous and determinant a feature of medieval history.' Of this change the bishop himself was a symbol, becoming 'not only the emperor's instructor in the catholic faith but also his adviser on questions of imperial policy.' The famous excommunication of the emperor Theodosius by Ambrose because of the massacre at Thessalonica is indeed 'the most momentous event of Ambrose's episcopate.' But Dr. Homes Dudden does not fail to point out also the mistakes made by Ambrose in political matters, especially in respect of the riot at Callinicum, remarking upon the 'really astounding perversity' of some of the arguments which he addressed to Theodosius, and how 'religious prejudice could so warp the judgment of a good and wise man,' and censuring his fanaticism.

Perhaps two of the most attractive chapters of these volumes are those describing the life and work of Ambrose at Milan (chapter V), and Ambrose in his cathedral (chapter XVIII); which present graphic pictures of ecclesiastical standards and customs. The scope designed by Dr. Dudden for his study also enables him to offer interesting and useful sketches of a wide variety of subjects, related only indirectly to his biographical theme. Amongst such are his descriptions of social life in Rome and Milan, and of churches and civic buildings in both cities; his excursus on Mystery Religions in chapter X (with his conclusion that 'both Mithraism and Christianity were mystery religions; each had the same general conceptions of blessing conferred on the race through a sacrifice, of a fellowship of the initiated, of salvation mediated through sacraments; and each tended almost inevitably to develop along similar lines'); on the cult of martyrs and the veneration of relics in chapter XII (with his description of this cult 'as a Christian development of pagan custom'); and on the career of Augustine till his baptism, though Ambrose and Augustine were never on intimate terms. Some of the most important items in these volumes consist of the extended footnotes, appended to several chapters; amongst which stand that on *The Services of Ambrose to Church Music* in chapter XI, which embraces the question of Ambrosian hymnody and of the bishop's authorship of hymns; and especially that on *Some Points of Interest in connection with Ambrose's Elevation* at the end of chapter III. Much useful information concerning episcopal elections is assembled here; and in particular Dr. Dudden, accepting the general statement of Paulinus concerning Ambrose that 'after his baptism he is reported to have filled all the ecclesiastical offices, and on the eighth day he was consecrated bishop,' offers a possible time-table by which Ambrose might have accomplished the *cursus honorum* in so brief a space. Wonder still remains, however, both as to the possibility of this progress, and as to the exact meaning of the statement of Paulinus!

Dr. Dudden concludes his study with three chapters on Ambrose as teacher of ethics and as theologian, and on his writings; which, though they are not easy reading because of their technicalities, constitute a most valuable portion of his work. Ambrose was typically Western in abilities and outlook; distrustful of abstract philosophical speculation, and resting his exposition of the faith upon authority; interested chiefly in the practical religious life of the Christian, and interpreting Christianity in terms of Law; he was not a great theologian, but he was entirely characteristic both in his strength and limitations, of the Church of the West. He stands at a transition period of church history; and he displays the authentic lineaments

of the great ecclesiastical statesmen of the medieval church in western Europe. Dr. Homes Dudden should receive the warm thanks and congratulations of students of church history for his volumes, and not least for the meticulously full footnotes and references, which make easy the task of following up his statements in original sources.

NORMAN SYKES.

CHRISTIANITY AND WAR*

The world does not want war, any more than the *bon-vivant* wants gout. But there are ways of life that will continue to produce war in the one case and gout in the other. It is obvious that war breaks out only after a period of malaise, a period of incubation, during which the stresses and strains that ill-living have accumulated at last grow too strong for the normal constitution of international relations to remove or to control. The titles of the books before us do not seem from this point of view particularly apt. *Is War Obsolete?* Not while nations ignore the rules of international hygiene. *War—its Curse and Cure.* Better to sacrifice the alliteration and read *War—its Curse and Prevention.*

Each author would recognise that in the last resort security from war must rest upon a moral basis. Canon Grane quotes Admiral Mahan, the great American naval historian as saying:

> 'I believe with the full intensity of personal conviction that when moral motives come to weigh heavier with mankind than material desires there will be no more war.'

So do we all believe. But in the meantime, while so often moral motives are ignored, or thought to be binding on individuals, but not on the State to which they belong; while mankind possesses a boundless capacity for duping itself or being duped by a controlled Press into believing that its grossest material desires are really its purest moral motives; and while even in the sphere of personal conduct the most candid self-critic does not always find it easy to distinguish good motives from bad, what are we to do?

The two books present different solutions. Professor Raven, while not condemning the internationalization of armed force under the League of Nations, thinks that the Church ought not to become an appendage of the League, or of any other political system. Here it is relevant to ask, is it not time someone protested against the frequently-made assumption that the Church cannot support anything whole-heartedly without becoming 'an appendage' of it? It would have been well for the Church if it had become 'an appendage' of the movements for humane legislation, for compulsory education, and for abolition of slavery. Canon Raven maintains that it should be the task of the Church to develop a truly Christian alternative to war in the shape of an Army of Peace, or of Evangelization; an army which should be ready to throw itself into the service of reconciliation, facing possible martyrdom, wherever the danger of war arises, thus demonstrating the superiority of love over force, and winning men to believe in it. Canon Grane, on the other hand, believes entirely in collective security as represented in the League system.

As the solutions are different so are the methods by which they are reached. Professor Raven's book is personal, intuitive. He shows us how his own mind has been shaped by his experiences before, during, and after

* *Is War Obsolete?* A Study of the Conflicting Claims of Religion and Citizenship. By Professor C. E. Raven, D.D. Halley Stewart Lectures, 1934. (Allen and Unwin. 1035. 4/6.) *War—Its Curse and Cure.* By William Leighton Grane. (Allen and Unwin. 1935. 4/6.)

the last war. There is little in the way of argument or analysis. We are not even told how the Peace Army is to work, what difficulties it is likely to meet, or what results it is to expect. The problem of war is approached from many points of view — a man's conflicting loyalties as they presented themselves in 1914 and as they would present themselves now (and we are told that in the author's case they would resolve themselves in a radically different way). There are separate discussions of Guidance, of the Christian and the State, of evolution and its struggle, once physical, now spiritual. These different chapters do not form steps in an argument. They read like the examination of so many perplexities in the author's mind, which have not been brought into any final synthesis. It is difficult to find what Professor Raven's position would be if this country got involved in war in spite of the efforts of the Army of Peace. He would seem to stand for a sort of modified pacifism. Though advocating disarmament and the refusal to fight, he admits that force is sometimes necessary. War between 'Christian and cultured men' is denounced as unthinkable, but not war 'in Palestine or on the North-West Frontier.' Recent events have shown that the distinction is not easy to make; it might even appear that the Army of Peace would find its efforts better rewarded 'in Palestine or on the North-West Frontier' than among Christian and cultured men.

Canon Grane approaches his subject historically, describing the gathering of the storm which broke in 1914, and the conflicts and false ideals which in the post-war years have again brought us perilously near just such another catastrophe, with a wealth of apt quotations from the most diverse sources. One is glad to have such a rich armoury from which to load one's gun in the cause of peace, but in so short a book perhaps there is overmuch quotation. At any rate, one misses again any clearly developed constructive argument. There is no examination of the case for collective security as against, for example, pacifism; nor is there any discussion of the difficulties in the way of securing collective action. We all know that burglary is wrong, and we none of us want our own houses rifled. But many of us would prefer to walk by on the other side if we saw an armed robber at work in a jeweller's shop. That seems to be the preference of the governments of Europe at the present time. We choose to leave the suppression of burglary to the police, and similarly it might be better to leave the enforcement of international law to an international police. But Canon Grane dismisses this proposal without examination.

St. Paul, in a famous controversy, exhorted the parties to 'follow the things which make for peace.' It is the things which between nations make for peace—and for war—that one would like to see further examined than they are in either of these books. We are learning that there are more effective and more Christian ways of preventing crime than increasing the rigour and certainty of punishment and detection. The same must apply with increased force to what may be called international crime, for whereas among individuals there may be such a thing as real perversion or evil will, such a thing can hardly exist throughout a whole nation. A nation cannot wage war effectively unless it is far more nearly of one mind about the war than it usually is over other matters of public policy, and that means that either the nation is forced to fight by a real need or that it is persuaded into thinking that such a real need exists. The problems of population, of the supply of raw material, of finance, of trade on the one hand; of government, of education, of freedom of speech and writing on the other, are fundamental for the peace and security of the modern world. It may be possible to prevent war by providing a whip for the aggressor.

But if the true aim is to establish peace (a very different thing), then the disharmonies which lead to war must be resolved. It is in promoting the new outlook which will permit of this, while at the same time supporting the machinery and sanctions of international law, that the Christian communities might be most usefully active.

R. J. STANFORD.

CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY*

Dr. W. J. Percy may seem to have chosen a strange title for his new book on cultural anthropology. It is important therefore to take note of the reasons given for his choice.

> 'Many peoples, separated by vast distances and long periods of time, agree, in the main, concerning the mode of origin of their culture. Their creation stories state that a community of beings in a sky-world drew up the first land from the depths of a Primordial Ocean which lay beneath them, in much the same way as the First Chapter of Genesis recounts the separation of land from the water. This incident is widespread in the creation stories of America, Northern Asia, Oceania, as well as of Japan, Ancient India, Babylonia, and Egypt. This unanimity, occurring as it does, in a long chain of communities which, for the greater part, owe their culture to the past, is striking. It suggests that, in spite of many differences, such peoples look back to a common source of inspiration. As the argument proceeds it will be seen that the incident of bringing up land out of the Primordial Ocean must have had a definite historical basis. It will be seen, moreover, that this original Ocean played a fundamental part in the organization of the early thought of food-producing men. Since the idea of unity of culture emerges from the discussions, it seems but fitting to express it in the title of this book. I have accordingly chosen the Primordial Ocean as the most striking symbol of that unity.'

This explains the title of the book. The reader will still wonder what is meant by saying that in the myths of creation the incident of bringing up land out of the primordial ocean must have had an historical basis. Historical basis is not, as a matter of fact, exactly what the writer means. This is clear from Chapter xxi of his book, a chapter which deals specifically with 'The Primordial Ocean.' Here, the primordial ocean having been identified with the expanse of water caused by the inundation of the Nile, Dr. Perry writes in the following terms.

> 'The study of myth and ritual carried on in the past few chapters has vindicated the belief of the Pawnee in the truth of their origin stories. What appeared to be the products of imagination, far removed from reality, have been shown to be part of concrete living experience. The incident of the creation of land, drawn up from the bottom of the primordial ocean by beings in a sky-world, acting under the commands of a supreme ruler, is nothing more or less than a garbled account of royal ceremonials that find their most realistic expression in Egypt. It is true that it has not been possible entirely to close the gap between tradition and reality, and mention will be made of this point in a later chapter. But we have got near enough to reality for present purposes. For instance, the great sanctuary of Memphis was built on a mound supposed to have been drawn up by Ptah, the mummy-god of that city, from the depths of the flood. Similarly with other great sanctu-

* *The Primordial Ocean.* An Introduction to Social Psychology. By W. J. Perry, M.A., D.Sc. (Methuen and Co., Ltd. 1935. Price 15/-.)

> aries, some of which, at least, had a sky-world within them. In the Sed Festival the king ascends a platform, and is then seated both in the sky and on earth. That is to say the primordial ocean is real enough in Egypt; the "sky-world" is real enough; the mummy of the dead king is real enough. What cannot be witnessed is the act of creation of the primordial ocean by Osiris, either before or after his death; but there evidently must have been some foundation for the belief that he did.'

Thus, the incident of drawing up land from the bottom of the primordial ocean can hardly be said to have had a historical basis, but it can be said to have been based upon a real event or situation. This is interesting because it is true of so many so-called 'primitive ideas.' Myths, as Dr. Perry and Professor A. M. Hocart insist, are not mere figments of the imagination. They have something concrete and real behind them. To regard them as products of pure fiction is entirely to misunderstand them. When we realize this, we shall be less reluctant to speak of stories in the Old Testament, such as those of the Creation, the Fall, the Flood, and the Tower of Babel as 'fiction.' Indeed, it is becoming clear that while it is not quite honest to speak without qualification of the truth of the Bible, we are fully entitled to speak of the truth behind the Bible.

Dr. Perry is of course a notorious diffusionist, and his faith in Egypt as the home of civilization to which every country in the world is indebted, directly or indirectly, for its culture, has never wavered. It has never wavered, in spite of the fact that he has kept himself informed of the startling discoveries made in recent years in Mesopotamia and India. And if his own position has not won general acceptance, he has seen the idea of diffusion becoming more and more widely adopted. If anyone any longer doubts the reality of diffusion in one direction or another his doubts will surely be dissipated on reading E. Gordon Childe's remarkable and wonderfully well-informed work, *New Light on the Most Ancient East* (Kegan Paul, 1934), which has as its sub-title 'The Oriental Prelude to European Prehistory.' Equally remarkable is J. H. Breasted's great work, *The Conquest of Civilization* (Harper and Brothers, 1926).

Dr. Perry's earlier works have been widely read. His new work will be equally welcome to many readers. He is always stimulating, because his originality never fails to startle or shock us, and so to arrest our attention. In *The Primordial Ocean* perhaps the most arresting chapter is one entitled 'The Achievement of Excellence.' Here the writer seeks to show by examples drawn from pottery-making, the fabrication of stone vases, stone-carving, wood-carving, painting, music, stone-construction, the writing of poetry and prose, medicine, philosophy, and education, that as a general principle,

> 'any new development of an art or craft, involving the factor of skill alone, rapidly achieves its summit of perfection, and then degenerates more or less continuously.'

For instance, competent authorities state that in the making of stone vases the Egyptians of the middle and later pre-dynastic periods arrived at astonishing accuracy and beauty of form, and that their achievements in the harder stones were never surpassed in later days. In proto-dynastic times these vases were already debased, and at the end of the Old Kingdom they disappear. Does this mean that as a rule only the originators of a new form of activity have a firm grasp of reality, while the vision of their followers and imitators is obscured?

Such investigations as those of Sir Grafton Elliot Smith, Dr. W. J. Perry, and Professor A. M. Hocart, which tend to show that persistent traditions must be taken more seriously, seem to be adding momentum to the forces which are undermining some of the old foundations of the higher criticism.

MAURICE A. CANNEY.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE THREE HOURS SERVICE.

SIR,

Dr. Dearmer's article on the 'Three Hours' Service places many real difficulties fairly before us, but I do not believe the abolition of the service is the best solution of the problem. There may be certain small parishes, like this one, where it would be unwise to attempt such a service, but there are many larger parishes in which the 'Three Hours' Service on Good Friday draws one of the largest congregations of the entire year. In our American cities this service has become so consecrated by tradition in the lives of successive generations that its omission would prove a distinct loss to thousands of men and women. To throw away such an opportunity of bringing people within our churches does not suggest constructive missionary planning.

One wishes that traditional abuses might yield to a re-arrangement of the service which would permit a series of addresses on the Purpose and Significance of the Atonement. Let the hymns and prayers be adapted to the message of the preacher. In this way historical perplexities would be dropped from our consideration, and a more definite objective would characterize the task of the Conductor. The custom of our lay people would be respected, and our Good Friday congregations would come to receive better instruction year after year.

J. FOSTER SAVIDGE (Rector).

Church of the Holy Communion,
Norwood, N.J.
January 2nd, 1936.

THE 'ANGER' OF GOD.

SIR,

Many of us must have profoundly regretted that in the special Form of Service (Form III) in commemoration of His Late Majesty King George V, it was commanded that the following should be said:—

Minister: Turn us, O God our Saviour.
Answer: And let thine anger cease from us.

In what way did their Graces the Archbishops think that these words would be suitable; and what are their meaning and implication? My own interpretation is this:—

(1) That our nation is sinful and needs to 'turn,' *i.e.* 'to repent' (which is probably true), and

(2) That God is angry with us and has shown his anger by removing our late King by death (which is certainly false).

Is it not a pity that when so many of us are striving week by week to eradicate untrue and inadequate ideas of God, we should be commanded to speak of God's 'anger' in this unfortunate way?

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